

The Eleventh and Twelfth
OF THE
Controversial
LETTERS,

O R
Grand Controversie,

Concerning

The pretended Temporal Authority
of *POPES* over the whole Earth,

And the

True Sovereign of *KINGS* within
their own respective Kingdoms.

Between two English Gentlemen,

The one of the Church of England:

The other of the Church of Rome.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Henry Brome* and *Benjamin Tooke*, at the Gun;
& at the Ship in *St. Pauls Church-yard*, 1674.

The Bleeding and Travelling

OF THE

Comptrolvers LETTERS

Grand Comptrolvers

The principal Temporal Authority
of the Kingdom of England

The Sovereign of the Kingdom
the respective Kingdoms

The one of the Church of England;
The other of the Church of Rome

Printed for James Smith and Nathaniel, at the Gun
& Stationers in St. Pauls Church-yard, 1674

FRIEND,



F all I have seen or heard you shall have it for Policy. Sir Wood-bee himself is no body to you. The sum of what I askt was in two words: *Are you a good Subject?* And the sum of your Answer is: *Betwixt you and me I would have it thought so, but make no words on't; private men must not meddle with things above them.* Here's *Ragion di stato* for you. Things above them? Why! is Honesty among you lookt upon as a thing out of reach? Are you of kin to the *Muscovite*, who being askt of his Faith in God, and hopes of Salvation, reply'd They were things above him, which he should be glad were true, but could not think so great a Majesty could ever think of so poor a man. Is it above you to be a good Subject, and a thing which you dare not confesse for modesty sake, and the imputation of sawciness? Are things carried so among you, that you must needs live unquietly, if your Neighbours know you deserve to live quietly? Is it become a piece of interest and policy to be ill thought of; and if there be an honest man among you, must he by all means make a secret on't, for fear of exasperating Supream Powers, and thrusting in betwixt two stones? How have I been mistaken! I took you for a plain dealing man, and you are the very Pink of Policy. But for meer shame I could find in my heart to quarrel with you, and cannot for my life but tell you, you have taken a great deal of pains to little purpose. Pray permit me to revenge your nicety by unmannerly bluntness, and to carry it to the uttermost, ask you how far you are from *Pedius* in the Satyr?

Fur es ait Pedio. Pedius quid? crimina rasis

Librat in Antithetis _____.

The question being of robbing no less than Sovereigns, *Are you a good Subject*, is but in less homely Terms, *Are you a Thief?*

And your Answers are as like as the Questions. Only *Pedius* was for Rhetorick, and you for History. Some say this, and some say that, which is all you tell me, is but Historical Antithesis.

You tell me I may judge as I please. I know I may, and I do judge as all men of judgment do. But pray remember those that do not plead directly *Guilty*, or *not Guilty*, cast themselves. Had I only desir'd to know what people say; it had been no such hard matter to have got Books, and read them my self, and never troubled you. I know the Arguments well enough, and I know what to think of them; but I know not what to think of you, whom a man that were not, as I am, very favourably inclin'd, would be apt to suspect you think something which you are asham'd to own. No *Friend*! You scape not so. I would, and if you be not very obstinate, will know what you are, and whether those of your Religion may be trusted. If you believe what is publickly written, and own'd by some among you, you are not; if you believe it not, but yet will not disown it; as honest as you are in your heart, since no body can tell but you are a knave, how can you expect but to pass for one among the rest? Either deal frankly with me, or I must with you, and tell you 'tis *Guilt* that fears the light. If you continue still to make a secret, of what of all the world it most concerns those of your Perswasion to publish, both for your own interest, and honour of your selves and Church, he must be a very good natur'd man who will think well of you, who make dainty to shew why he should do so. You are charg'd with inconsistency with Civil Government: You faintly deny it, and say you are traduc't, but are shy to justify your Innocence. your Church it self is call'd in question, where the Books are licenc't, the Authors cherisht, and the Doctrines put in practice. You tamely hear all this, and would have us think your Church a good Church for all that, a pure unblemish't Church: but, if we will not of our selves kindly turn away our eyes and look off, you will not do so much for her as wipe off those blemishes.

'Tis true you have told me, and 'tis the only thing to purpose you have told me, that That cannot be the Churches Doctrine, which is openly disclaim'd by a great part of the Church, and that part acknowledg'd Orthodox by all the rest. But if your Church forbid any to profess their minds as freely

as others, it must needs be suspected She has more kindness for these Doctrines than is for Her honour : and, however sound she may be, is yet a very injurious Church, which obliges her Subjects to pass for suspicious and dangerous people, and be thought to hold what they are not oblig'd to do, and what perhaps they do not hold, but must not say so. Besides, I have already told you the Case is not much different, whether these Doctrines belong to your Faith or not, if they be thought true; for that is enough to make them practic'd upon occasion. And if your Church permit none to say they are false, who can think but she desires they should pass for true, and that they will do so at last if they do not already? And then truly we have great security from your Answer; as if, because these Doctrines do not belong to your Church, as Church, they might not be made use of by your Church as so many men.

I told you this before, and you saw well enough how much your Churches reputation was concern'd, notwithstanding what you say for her: and yet you continue cold, and will say no more. Never tell me. This Lethargy of yours is not for nothing. If you be grown careless of your own credit and interest, I thought nothing could have quench't the Zeal you all have of your Church. How! a Papist insensible when the Honour of his Church is in question? Deny it as long as you will, either you are forbidden to speak, and let people know what you harbour in your breasts, or you harbour something there which 'tis not for your interest people should know. In short, this constraint which is upon you must either be from abroad, or at home. You deny there is any from abroad: And I hope you say true; otherwise, I know not what to think of a Church which permits not her Subjects to approve their fidelity to their Prince. If it be at home, it can be nothing but Guilt, and shame, and the Conscience of adhering to bad Tenets. For, I hope, you do not think in earnest the State should take it ill of any, who should profess as openly as he will, that he is an honest man and a good Subject. If you fear nothing from your own side, it goes very ill with you if you have to fear from ours. We know who they are to whom the Civil sword is a Terrour.

Excuse

Excuse not your self upon my curiosity, and think it inconsiderable and unworthy of satisfaction. 'Tis true, I am curious, and if I were not, you would make me so. But let me tell you, my curiosity is more a friend to you than your squeamishness. For, pray consider, No Commonwealth, at least none of a different Communion is safe, where those Doctrines are receiv'd, which are current among some of you. Who's the Friend? I, who give you occasion, and press you to clear your selves? or you, who by your backwardness, will make it shortly be thought you cannot be clear'd? I know well enough, there is no great Community, nor can be, whose Members are all free from fault. The nature of mortality bears not an absolute perfection. But do you think it a small point of friendship, that I offer you the means to make it appear, that whoever is faulty, you are not? Every body can tell, and were it put to your self, I am fully perswaded, you would not deny it, that he is not very well principled for a Subject, who believes what some of you teach. While you make such a mystery of it, no body can say you are not of the number, and many will suspect you are. In fine, there is no choice; but either you do believe ill, and then I must change my good thoughts of you; or you do not, and then either say so plainly, or you are the most superlative Politick in the world, to take other mens faults upon you, and entitle your self to a guilt which is none of your own.

If you will give off the defence of your Church, and leave her to shift, as well as she can, for her self; why, with all my heart: I have no reason to wooe you to a sense of your Churches reputation. If you will grow careless of your own fame, and be content to have it thought you deserve the harsh censures which some make of you, you may too, if you please, though, as a Friend, I would advise you to do otherwise. But let me tell you, if you become forgetful, we shall not. We remember, there was such a time as 88, and a thing call'd the Invincible *Armada*, and which might have been so indeed, if the Commanders had not been more careful to stick punctually to their Orders, then do their business. We remember, the cause of all this was, what *Sixtus* the Fifth calls Heresie of the Queen, which mov'd him to expose the Kingdom as a prey, and *Philip* the Second to seize it. We know this cause remains,

and

and hope it will do so: If it have not wrought since, we may thank the want of opportunity, and prospect of another *Armada*. But when occasion serves, we cannot but think, the same cause will be apt to produce the same effect.

Now, pray review your Politicks, and see whether they will counsel you to settle this opinion among your fellow-Subjects, that in such a case, which may happen, because it hath happened, there are who would joyn with an enemy, and help to enslave their Countrey; and that you are the men. If your Politicks do advise you to this, they are the worst natur'd, unkindest Politicks in the world. I am sure, let who will be the Politician, I am the Friend: But however they advise you, we, who are no Politicians, should be glad to know there are none such among us, or if there be, who they are. We value our own safety, though you do not your credit.

Notwithstanding, if you will persist in your Politick diffidence, and think, we Hereticks are not to be trusted so far, as to be made acquainted that you are not errant Knaves, I cannot help it. But I will convince you, if I can, that there is something more then bare curiosity in the matter. Let me tell you, in confidence, since this business must needs be made a secret, that I am no such stranger to it, as you think: I have thought of it a whole Moneth at least, and am deceiv'd, if I do not see a little into the Millstone. At least, I am sure, my eyes have one advantage, which, I suspect, yours may want, that they are not dazled with the lustre of great Names. *Bel-larmin*, or *Calvin*, or if there be any of a more glorious sound is no more to me then his reason, and at the hazard of being thought blunt, or rash, or over-weening. I must needs avow to you, I am for the *what's said*, and care little for *who said it*. If every body were of my humor, I mainly suspect, this Indirect Power, which makes so much ado, would have long since appeared neither better nor worse then direct non-sense. Pray let us consider it a little.

The Question is, *Whether there be in the Pope an Indirect Power to depose Kings*. He that would know, whether this be true or no, should do well, in my opinion, to take along with him, what it means. 'Tis a Circumstance, I must confess, which is oft forgot, and that forgetfulness, I believe, is the cause we find so much blind mans Buff in Books. But yet for once,

it

it will not be amiss to remember it. And because every body knows what *Pope* and *Power* means, likewise what 'tis to *Depose*, and what a *King* is, there is only this *Indirect* which needs unriddling. Now we often hear of *Indirect* dealing, and *Indirect* courses in the world, and 'tis hard if people do not know what they mean. Indeed we are apt when we hear these words, to apprehend something shameful or bad, because there is generally something shameful joyned with them, fair ends being ordinarily fairly pursued. But yet shameful is not the notion of *Indirect*: For a good and commendable thing may be brought to pass *Indirectly*, and if it be bad, the badness is one thing, and *Indirectness* another. The Merchant who met with Pirates in the dusk of the evening, when they could not discover his weakness, and frighted them off by a counterfeit confidence, hanging out his lights all night, sav'd his Ship *indirectly*, or by *indirect* means, when direct fighting or flying had lost it: And the Owner, I suppose, did not think this *Indirectness* blameable. A *Nuncio* of a certain place is reported to have publish'd an Excommunication, thought unjust by the persons concern'd; they had no power to take off this Excommunication themselves, or command the *Nuncio* to do it. Wherefore they took an *indirect* course, and set Guards upon the *Nuncio's* House, and suffered no Victuals to be brought in, till he thought it better to recal his Excommunication, then starve. These men too compass their end *indirectly*, yet commendably, supposing the Excommunication was indeed unjust. When *David* caused *Uriah* to be slain, the action was both *indirect* and wicked, but yet for several respects: 'Twas wicked, because it was the death of an innocent man, but *indirect*, because he did not himself kill him, or command him to be kill'd, but ordered that out of which his death followed. Wherefore when we say, a thing is done *indirectly*, we mean, as I conceive, that something is done, which we would, or could not do, by immediately endeavouring the thing it self, but which follows from some other thing we do. And *Indirect* signifies, not directed immediately to that thing, in respect whereof 'tis called *Indirect*, but to some other; out of which what happens, whether by design or chance, we say, happens *indirectly*.

Now if this be the meaning of *Indirect*, I am something at a loss,

loss, how it can with propriety be apply'd to Power. For Power seems as direct to every effect as to any : Neither do I perceive how it can be directed otherwise, than by being determined. When a man of the many things, he can do, resolves upon one, the power he has becomes, by that resolution, determined or directed to that one, which he chuses; what other direction there can be of power occurs not to me at present. But if Indirect apply'd to Power signifie undetermin'd, there is plainly no room for the distinction of Direct and Indirect. For every Power is undetermin'd till it become determined; and when it is determined, it is direct, or directed, to that thing to which it is determined; neither can there be such a thing as Indirect Power from which any thing can follow; for nothing can follow from a power undetermined, and Power from which nothing can follow is not Power. And the truth is, we do not give the name of Power to that which goes indirectly to work. Not, but that the intended effect may follow, but we call it not Power in relation to such an effect. We do not, nor can with truth say, a King has power to take away the lives of innocent Subjects, although he may, as *David* did *Uriah*, command them something by which their Death may happen. The Merchant ow'd his safety not to power, but stratagem and luck : And those who starv'd the *Nuncio*, had no power to take off the Excommunication, on the contrary 'twas their want of power which made them act as they did. So that I suspect those who first joyn'd these two words Indirect and Power together, did not much amuse themselves with considering the import of them : Indirect seeming a kind of *Destroying*, or, as they call it, *Alienating* Term, and making the Power to be not-Power. Wherefore I believe 'tis Action, or Effect which is with propriety call'd Indirect, not Power. But, yet because it matters not, so we understand one another, what words we use, Power to an Indirect effect may with sence be called Indirect power. So a Prince who, to recover or preserve his right, has direct power to make war, may be said to have indirect power over his Subjects lives, which must be hazarded in the war. In this manner Indirect Power is intelligible, and signifies Power to something out of which follows another thing, which would not follow immediately from the Power it self. This other thing may either be intended, as the Death of *Uriah*,

or not intended, as when one is slain in war whom the Prince is sorry to loose. And from this Intention comes Wickedness or Innocence, not Indirectness, which proceeds only from this, that the effect flows not immediately from the power, but is joyn'd to something which does.

But now Indirect Power is become intelligible, let him make it intelligible that can, how the Deposing Power, said to be in the Pope, should be Indirect. If he can command Deposition, and must be obey'd when he commands, and the Prince depos'd by force of that command, his Power is as direct as Power can be. For when the Pope says, *I Depose*: I pray what is it which he commands? I understand he commands Deposition it self, and not another thing out of which he expects Deposition should follow. Again, when his command, as the luck on't is, it *seldom* does, proves effectual, and a King is deposed: pray in vertue of what is he Deposed? I understand 'tis in vertue of that command. Now, because that Power is direct, which immediately commands an effect, which follows from that Command or Power, there neither is nor can be any Indirectness found here, but in the very notion of Direct. So that I told you 'twas a scurvy thing to jabber words, and never mind what they signifie. For there is nothing in all this which Indirect power can mean, but Direct Power. In fine, there is no way to make this Power Indirect, but by saying either that the Pope, when he commands Deposition, does not command Deposition, which for my part I would not do, because I fear I should tell a lye: or else, that Deposition does not follow from that from which it follows; and if I should say this too, I fear I should tell two lies. But however, since Indirect sure must be some way opposite to Direct, The Popes Power to be Indirect must be some way not directed to Deposition. Which way this should be, he must be wiser than I that can tell. If Determination or Intention would do it, sure it cannot be thought he is not determin'd, or does not intend to do that which he commands. And if the Directness be taken, as it ought, from the immediate influence of the power upon the effect, we see he precisely commands this particular effect, and 'tis maintained this effect must follow in vertue of that command. Now if any man can understand how a Power should be Indirect in respect of an Effect to which it is directed all the ways by which Power can

can be directed ; I would gladly be directed to that man , to learn of him how nonsense may become sence. But till I do meet him , I must needs think that this distinction of Direct and Indirect in this case , is a meer sound of words which signify nothing , and by which the Authors speculate themselves into nonsense, and abuse themselves and their Readers.

I am not ignorant that those who maintain this Indirect Power speak otherwise of it ; but I think I speak as all men, besides themselves, speak , and know not by vvhhat right they force upon vvords meanings proper to their purpose, and contrary to what general custom has fixt upon them. To alter common and settled Notions, is to perplex and embroyl things, and condemn the inquiries of men to hopeless and endless confusion. For Truth is discovered by seeing the connexion of Notions ; and Notions are known by Words : and if the Notions belonging to vvords remain not steady and unchanged, our search after Truth must needs end in uncertain noise, and inextricable blunder. He who has the liberty to alter the notion of vvords , is empowered to maintain any thing. If he take a fancy to defend that *Jet* is vvwhite , 'tis but by vvwhite meaning black, and the business is done. Where I see Notions changed I am mighty suspicious there is a design upon some Truth or other in the Changers. And so I fear it happens in our case. For if Indirect Power mean, according to the apprehension of men, Power to an Indirect effect, Those who will maintain in the Pope an Indirect Power must , to speak sence, say, that, though he has not immediately and properly Power to Depose , yet he has power to do something out of which Deposition vvill follow. And this they vvould fain be at. For , give them their due, they are no enemies to sence, vvwhile sence is no enemy to them. They offer therefore sometimes at Excommunication, and vvould make us believe that from thence must follow Deposition. Excommunication is vvwithout doubt a proper effect of Spiritual Power , and so comes vvithin the sphere of the Popes activity, and if it vvould but follow, that an Excommunicated Person can have no Communication no vvay, and vvith none ; An Excommunicated Prince vvould by that means be Deposed. For he could not govern those vvith vvvhom he could have no entercourse, and if he could no longer govern , he vvwere no longer King.

This now is sence, and intelligible; but the mischief is, it will not do. They find Excommunication, when they consider it a little better, hinders indeed Communion in Spirituals; but if there be any temporal tye to the Excommunicated person, as of a Wife to a Husband, a Servant to his Master, all Subjects to their Prince, Excommunication leaves this as entire and strong as it was before. Any that has business with him, may deal with him notwithstanding his Excommunication. For it would be fine, if, when an Excommunicated person owes me money, I should not require my debt of him because he is Excommunicated. Wherefore no Excommunication will hinder a Prince from conversing freely with his Subjects, and his Subjects with him. Nay, they are obliged to all the acts of Duty to which they were before, and not to become faulty themselves, if perhaps their Prince be so. Wherefore because this will not hold water, they will not trust to it, but think it safer to make bold with a word and give it a new notion, than venture the cause upon a foundation which they are conscious will fail them. 'Tis a great deal better to talk a little non-sence, than by obstinately sticking to sence, hazard the loss of a good Cause. That the Pope shall have power to depose Kings, come what will, they are resolv'd. And because the Canonists do not thrive very well with their extravagance of making him sole and absolute Monarch of the World, they think fit to be a little more modest, and allay the bold heat with sprinkling this Indirect vpon it. But then the notion of that word importing what they cannot make good, there is no remedy but they must give it another. If they could have kept the sence too, it would have been so much the better; but since that will not be, they think it at least something, if their Tenet, let it signifie what it will, sound not altogether so harshly as the Canonists, with which they perceive the World not very well pleas'd.

Bellarmino therefore applies this lenitive, and saies the Pope disposes of Temporals only Indirectly: but whether he forgot the impertinent Circumstance, or had any other reason, never tells us what that word means in his *Rom. Pont.* where he first uses it, but leaving it to shift for it self, and us to guess what it means, goes on to prove the power which he calls Indirect, never offering to shew that 'tis Indirect. Neither is there any
mention,

mention, or use made of the word, that I perceive, in the whole course of his Arguments. So that 'tis manifest, Power was the thing for which he was concern'd: For the *Indirect*, he thought it no great matter what became of it, being perhaps in his own judgment but an insignificant sound, without influence upon the thing. Nevertheless against *Barclay*, when he had bethought himself, he kindly tells us what he means. *The Popes Power*, says he, is per se, and properly spiritual, and therefore has reference Directly to spiritual matters as the primary object: but Indirectly, that is, in order to Spirituals, reductively, and by necessary consequence, to use that phrase, looks upon Temporals as a secondary object, to which it applies not it self but upon occasion, casu or casualiter, as the Canon speaks. This is, if you will, consequential, or reductive, or secondary, not Indirect Power. For I think all the world will say a King has very direct Power to make War, and yet he does it not but upon occasion, and in order to peace, and in consequence of his power to maintain peace, and establish plenty, and security, and convenience, which is his primary object, and to which making war is by necessary consequence reduc'd. But however 'tis a comfort to know what he means: And now we know what we talk of, let us a little consider the import of the Thing, and leave the Terms, which if he will use improperly, I have not so much as indirect power to help it. 'Tis likely that to deal with words as he pleases, is not the only Priviledge of a Cardinal.

In the first place then, I would fain know what real difference this word *Indirect* makes betwixt his opinion and the Canonists, which even he himself disproves. And we will take the Canonists opinion, as he states it himself:

That the Pope has by divine right most full power over the whole World, both in Ecclesiastical and *De Rom. Pont.*
l. 5. c. 1.

Political matters. In this there are three particulars: That the Popes Power is most full; That 'tis in Political and Civil, as well as Spiritual matters; And that 'tis by Divine right. In one of these three he must disagree with them, if he will disagree at all. Now his own opinion in his own

Terms is: *That the Pope, as Pope, has not directly* *Ibid.*
and immediately any temporal, but only spiritual Power: but yet by reason of this spiritual Power, he has at least Indirectly, a certain, and that highest (summam) Power in Temporals.

I am unsatisfi'd with more then one thing in this opinion, as you will perceive by and by. But for the present, I only desire an *Oedipus*, to unriddle to me the difference betwixt the two opinions. The Canonists say, the Popes Power is *Plenissima*; Bellarmine says, *Summa*: They say, 'tis over *Temporals as well as Spirituals*; he says, 'tis *Spiritual, or over Spirituals, and over Temporals too*. They say, 'tis by *divine Right*, and in this you may be sure he will not quarrel with them; 'tis true, he forgot to express it here, but he says it often enough elsewhere. They say no more, and he says all this: Where is, or where can be the difference? Or shall we once in our lives find an example of things different, which differ in nothing? He puts indeed Direct and Immediate Power, as that which he would deny; But if he have rightly express'd them, they mean by their Direct and Immediate, if any where they use those terms no more then *Plenissima*, and he understood they meant no more: And if his *Summa*, do not say as much as their *Plenissima*, take in Direct and Immediate and all, I am much mistaken; neither can I think, but *Summa* will abundantly satisfy them, or if it do not, they are very unsatiable men. At least this is very clear, that all the difference he can pretend, must lye in this word, *Indirectly*: And this he tells us at last, imports respect to a secondary object. As if the Canonists ever deni'd Spirituals to be the primary object of the Popes Power, or cared a jot which was primary, and which secondary, so he had full power over both.

Because I do not love to see Friends fall out, I will answer for the Canonists for once, and engage they shall not quarrel with him for putting in a word more then they, as long as that word signifies but what they think as well as he. They are men who will hearken to reason, and not fall irreconcilably out with a man for expressing their mind in his own words. They have no quarrel to *Secondarily*, and will make none for calling this *Secondarily* by the name of *Indirectly*. Allow them but their *Plenissima*, and they shall keep the peace, I warrant them. Here is then no difference but only of a word, which they that use, and they that use not, both think the same. Sure Bellarmine was in a pleasant humor, when he would go about to perswade the world, that full Power in the Pope, is a great error, and contrary to Christian Doctrine, if you call
this

this full Power *Direct* : But if you call it *Indirect*, then all's well, and Christian Doctrine safe. And all this while *Direct* full Power is no more then most full Power, and *Indirect* no less. My Masters ! We had need have a care of our words. He that has the knack on't, may say unoffensively, and make good Doctrine of that, which, if it be less luckily worded, may chance destroy the Law of Christ, and undo the world. What difference betwixt this, and *Mentalto's Pouvoir prochain* ? And which of the two is the more serious trifter ? And yet to see what a conceited world we live in ! There are who make no difficulty to disclaim the Canonists freely, and call their opinion extravagant and naught, and what you will : But propose the very same opinion to them, with no other difference in the world then this insignificant sound, *Indirectly* ; and as if there were charm in those four syllables, they become presently shy and mysterious, and will rather hazard to be *ill* thought of themselves, then say what they think. I know a certain Gentleman, who writ to me not long since of this very matter, who, I think, was charm'd for company ; but I name no body. Charms usually last but to a certain time, and when the term is past, the man perhaps may recover.

But now I think on't better, 'tis good not to be too positive. These *Reductives*, and *Secondaries*, and *Consequentials*, are crabbed words, and I am a meer bungler at School-gibberish. I fear, it may be with that, as the Poet said pleasantly, of another sort of canting : People must be mad before they can understand it. Subtle men say, there is a difference betwixt five, and two and three : And some such difference, for ought I can answer, there may be here. The Pope may be said in one opinion to look straight forward, and in the other a squint upon Temporals, which is a difference, such as it is, but which hinders not, but the squint-ey'd man may hit as surely and as strongly as the other. Now because I am not concern'd in the airy speculations of your *Eus-rationis-men*, nor mean to be, I will not much stand with them for a Cobweb-difference or two, which may pass with such as are mad enough to understand it. But I look for a difference, which we dull men of the world may be able to conceive : A substantial and useful difference, by which it may appear, that whereas one opinion is naught and dangerous, the other is innocent and safe. I would see
how

how your indirect men are better Subjects then the other, and faster to their Prince and their Duty : how they are less guilty of wrong, to the Sovereignty and Independence of Princes : in short, how they are not as bad as those who are direct Knaves. These are the things, in which alone the world is concern'd : if the two opinions agree in these, let them differ in inconsiderable niceties, as much as they will ; they are the same in danger, the same in inconsistency with Civil Government, and that, if you remember, was the thing with which we began, and where, for ought I see, we still stick. Till I see such a difference, I must needs think all you have said, no better then pure illusion, and all you can say, till you say, where this difference is, will be but to talk learnedly from the purpose.

For my part, I must profess, I can find none : But because I would be glad to learn of any body, I will entreat *Bellarmino* to tell me, what difference he finds, and what provision he makes, with his learned distinctions, for the Security of Princes, and Fidelity of Subjects. The first, which comes in my way, is in the state of the Question, *That the Pope directly and immediately, hath not any temporal Power, but only spiritual ; but indirectly at least, in vertue of this spiritual Power, hath highest or sovereign Power over Temporals.* And because Directly's and Indirectly's should break no squares, he leaves them out against

Barclay, when he had a mind to speak properly :
Cap. 12. When we speak properly, says he, we say, the Pope has Power in, or over Temporals, but not Temporal Power, as Pope.

Now to acknowledge my ignorance, I must confess, I am quite gravel'd at very first, and cannot for my life, imagine, what kind of thing this only Spiritual, and not Temporal Power, should be, which yet is highest or sovereign, even in Temporals. Without doubt, vve men of the vworld are vvonderful ignorant things, and if vve but offer to understand any thing, these Scholars say, 'tis odds vve mar all. Who of our lovv form, but vvould have thought, that Povver over Temporals had been Temporal Povver ? If I mistake not, I have heard from some body, that had some acquaintance vvith these Scholars, that Powers are specif'd by their Acts, which is indeed too high for me : It may be to purpose, and it may not. But I had verily thought, that who could do temporal things, had
temporal

temporal power, and vvho could do spiritual things, spiritual! I was out it seems, and perceive now that properly speaking 'tis otherwise. For all that, I cannot but think there is such a thing as Temporal Power in the vvorld, and if Power in Temporals be not It, there remains nothing that I know, which can be It, but Power in Spirituals; and for the same reason Power in Temporals must be Spiritual Power; and so Kings, because they have to do vvith Temporals, have in truth Spiritual Power; only vve speak improperly in the vvorld, and call it Temporal. But this does not fadge neither. For then the Pope should be said to have Temporal power, for this proper reason, because he has power in Spirituals.

Now I remember me there is a certain Pope Inno. 3. C. per
vem Qui filii
sini legit. vvho says, Kings have no Superior in Temporals. This *Barclay* objected to *Bellarmin*, and he answers that by Superiour in Temporals, is meant a Temporal Superior. Now I consider not how vvell this answers *Barclay*. For let the Superiour be a temporal, or a spiritual Superiour, so he be Superiour in Temporals, The King has a Superiour in Temporals. But this is not to my purpose. I only observe that *Bellarmin* vvvas of the mind, vvhen he vvrote this, that Superiour in Temporals was all one vvith Temporal Superiour. And then I see no reason in the vvorld, vvhy power in Temporals should not also be all one vvith Temporal power. Certainly, since Power makes the Superiour, there is as much *sympathy* betwixt the Superiour and the Power as this comes too.

But in the name of vvonder, vvhat does Power in Temporals signifie, and vvhat Temporal Power? *Bellarmin* means the Pope may by his power in Temporals dispose of the temporal thing call'd a Kingdom. The Canonists mean some such thing by their Temporal Power. By this account both signifie power to dispose of Temporals, and methinks 'tis no such mortal quarrel vvwhether a dog must be said to be beaten vvith a stick, or a staff. Or, are they perhaps mere sounds, to vvwhich belongs no sence, but vvhat they give them as they find convenient for their purpose; and so vvhen vve are askt vvhat Temporal, or what in Temporals signifies, we must answer vvith *Montalto*, *What you please Father?* Never believe me if I can make more of this in Temporals, then an Inchant'd Castle vvwhich houses and entertains the Knight as long as he has use of it, and as soon as he is gone vanishes into a pure Temporal Inn. Which way soever I turn me, I am quite at a loss; so that I think 'tis best to give it over, and let *Bellarmin*

alone vvith his power over Temporals, and no Temporal Power; and speak to you in a language vvhich both of us understand.

Do you in earnest believe there is any such difference betwixt these two, that the one makes a good, the other a bad Subject? And that a King is safe enough as long as his Subjects speak properly. Marry, if their language once become less exact, then let him look to himself. Good School-masters are the only Guards if this be true. I am afraid to meddle vvith *Bellarmin* again; for vvwhether I say I, or no, 'tis odds, but I shall be out still. But yet I guess he meant his Power in Temporals is truly Power. If it be true Power, sure there is true obedience due to it. And if all Christians are bound to obey him in Temporals, Kings can have no Subjects but Infidels, unless to be even with the Pope, they fall to commanding in Spirituals. For if they can command in nothing, I do not see how they are Kings. But this is but shifting sides, and leaves us still vvhere vve vvare. Let *Bellarmin* say vvhat he vvill; He vvho has power to command is to be obey'd; if the Pope can command in Temporals, I must obey him in Temporals: And he vvhom I must obey in Temporals, is my King and no body else. So that the Pope is universal Monarch vvithout more ado, and there is no King in the World besides himself. For 'tis not the proper name of Power, but Power vvhich does the business. Call it how you vvill, properly or improperly, if there be a Power in the vvorld vvhich Kings themselves must acknowledge, and submit their Crowns, and leave their Kingdoms vvhen this Power requires them, They are not Kings, I mean, Sovereigns of vvhom vve only speak. And they vvare mightily out vvho said Princes vvare *solo Deo minores*, that they vvare accountable only to him, and had none else above them, and twenty other such untrue things. For *Bellarmin* has found one that is above them, and I fear above God too: at least he can take away vvhat God gave, vvhich is to make a little too bold vvith him.

But I am out again, as I fore-saw I should be. All this, says *Bellarmin*, follows from the vvicked direct Temporal Power of the Canonists, not from my innocent Indirect power over Temporals. I told you there vvvas no meddling vvith Schollers. While vve keep vvithin our own verge, vve may happily light upon a little indirect sence, vvhich may serve turn, and do vvell enough among our selves: but if vve go beyond our bounds, and tread the forbidden paths of Scholler-ship, it turns presently direct nonsense, I verily thought this had follow'd! But it seems it does not.

Bellarmin

Bellarmin has stopt the Carrier with a Distinction, which for fear of mistakes you shall have in his own words. If,

saies he, *there were in the Pope Spiritual and Temporal power directly, and he were King of the World, as he is* Adver. Barc. c.5.

Bishop of the universal Church, and other Kings did but meerly execute temporal Jurisdiction; truly the Pope might at his pleasure deprive whatsoever Kings of the administration and execution of temporal Jurisdiction, and by this means take away Civil government, or confound it with the Ecclesiastical, and would be greater then Christ, because he could take away Powers which he willed should be, and be distinct. These now to my apprehension are naughty things, and the opinion, out of which they follow, a naughty opinion. And I must needs commend Bellarmin for chusing another, out of vvhich it may not follow, that Popes at their pleasure may deprive any King of the execution of temporal Jurisdiction, and take away Civil government, and be greater than Christ. This, you see, is vvhath he saies follows from the other opinion, and vvhath he makes us expect does not follow from his. Let us hearken then to what he saies of it, and understand it if vve can. But, goes he on, *if we put in the Pope only Spiritual power Directly, and Temporal Indirectly, that is only in order to Spirituals, it does not follow that the Pope can take away, or confound Civil government.* Once in my life I was in the right. This is what I thought was not to follow. What is that which does then? Why, *It follows only,* saies he, *that the Pope by his Spiritual and Apostolic most eminent Power can direct and correct the Civil Power, and if it be needful, to the Spiritual end take it away from one Prince, and give it to another.*

Pray assist me a little, for I am in again as deep, as just now with in Temporals not Temporal. Was not this taking away Civil power the thing vvhich he said did not follow from his opinion, and does he not now say it does? Or have I rendred him amiss? Let me see; his own words are; *non sequitur posse tollere sed salum sequitur posse adimere.* O! 'tis tollere which does not follow, and only adimere vvhich follows. And here's a plain difference, for one vvord has four syllables, and the other but three. The mischief is, those who understand not Latin will not presently find it, and I hardly know how to help them. For whether it be that Latin be the more proper language for distinctions, or that he be better at Latin, then I at English, I am puzzled to render it: And yet I have consulted my Dictionary, but there is but one English word, *to take away*, for both. But merhinks it sounds scurvily to say, *it does not follow he can take away*, but it does fol-

low he can take away. That looks like saying and unsaying, giving and taking, vvhich is Childrens play. To make some difference then, we must say, It does not follow he can *take away*, but it follows he can *away-take*: which, though it be to force the language a little, yet 'tis better to make bold vvith that, then spoil the fence, and make no distinction at all. Princes then were in a sad case if the wicked doctrine of the *Casuits* were true, that their Kingdoms may *be taken away*, but as long as they may only be *away-taken*, all's vvell enough.

But yet this is not well neither. *Bellarmin* loves to speak properly, and this *away-take* perhaps would not please him, as indeed it has but an odd sound. To be then both just to him, and not injurious to our language, we vvill put it thus: It does not follow he can take away Civil power vvith a vvord of three syllables, it only follows he can take it away with a word of four. This is true English, and a true difference. For one kills *en Tierce*, and the other *en Quart*, which though they may happen from the same hand, and the same sword, are yet distinct killings. And so thanks to *Bellarmin*, we have master'd a deep point of learning, and understand the Canonists opinion is a very wicked opinion, because it exposes a Prince to the villanous thrust *en Tierce*, but *Bellarmin's* very innocent, vvich laies him open only to the faire *en Quart*. Now you may judge with your infallible judgment as you please, but I must needs think that to take away, with a word of 4, or if you will 40 syllables, is to take away, and to hit *en Quart* is to hit; and if any judge these things may be practic'd upon our sacred Sovereign; I must farther think, and plainly tell you he deserves to be confuted by Judge and Executioner too.

But stay! May not *Bellarmin* say perhaps, that to take away Civil Power from one Prince, and give it to another, is not absolutely to take away Civil Power, but only to translate it; since the Power remains, only put into other hands. Truly he may say this for ought I know, and twenty other things, of which I shall never dream. But I think he could not mean it in this place. For here he intends to speak contrary to the *Canonists*: and, as mad as they are, I believe there is none among them so senseless to say or think, that Civil power can absolutely be taken away out of the vvorld, by the most direct and unlimited Power that is or can be. They know vvell enough there must be Civil Power as long as there is Civil Government, and there must be Civil government as long as there be Cities and Men. So that Civil Power can no more, nor sooner be taken out of the vvorld than Mankind. For
should

Should the Pope take all Power into his own hands, and appoint Lieutenants here and there, where he could not be in person; these Lieutenants must of necessity have and exercise Civil Power, even though they were Churchmen; As the Pope himself actually does. For when in his own Territories he punishes Malefactors for civil Crimes, he does not do this in vertue of his Spiritual power, but as a Temporal Prince, as one that has Civil power as well as Ecclesiastical. Wherefore I conceive *Bellarmin* cannot say he meant his taking away Power, of taking it absolutely out of the world, taking from one and giving to another being not to take away Power it self, but to translate it; because there is no way by which Civil Power can be taken away, but only by translating; nevertheless, if he did, as this is not the first time he has said what he had no great reason to say, I must tell him, that this translating is every jot as unsatisfactory to us, because 'tis every jot as unsafe to our Sovereign, as plain taking away. For if it be taken away from him, vvhoever has it next, 'tis taken away from him. And vvhoever holds this may be done, let *Bellarmin* speak never so subtly, I must hold is no good Subject.

There is another distinction or two, or explication, or vvhat you vvill call them vvwhich stick in my stomach. To understand them the better, it vvill be convenient to mention the occasion he had to make them. *Barclay* in his 12th. Chapter objected against his opinion, that it makes Christian Princes Vassals to the Pope, and hold their Kingdoms only at pleasure, or precariously. And this he proves by this Argument: *The Pope if it be necessary for the good of Souls may take away a Kingdom from one Prince, and give it to another; but to judge and decree whether it be necessary or no, belongs to the Pope, and none must judge whether his Sentence be right or wrong; Therefore he may at pleasure Dethrone the one and Crown the other.* *Bellarmin* Answers, that Christian Princes must by no means be call'd the Popes Vassals, and much less be said to hold their Kingdoms at pleasure, But are true Kings, and true Princes. This goes well; but yet if his opinion make them Vassals, I hope they may without offence to it be call'd so. But however Princes are to thank him for this confession that they are true Kings and Princes, and may hope so much may, for his sake, pass for true doctrine: Which if it once do, there is so much true fidelity due to those true Kings, that what takes it but indirectly away, will be found directly false.

Coming then to speak to *Barclay's* Argument, he says 'tis faulty every where, major and minor and all. Still there is no meddling with Schollers. These two premises of *Barclay* are two Propositions

tions which he has borrowed from *Bellarmin* himself, and were very good Propositions, as long as he had the handling of them; but as soon as ever another but breaths on them, they fade and wither to non-sence; and yet I perceive no alteration in them, but that before they came out of *Bellarmins* mouth, and now out of *Barclays*. However he tells us, This Propolition, *The Pope may, if it be necessary for the good of Souls, take away a Kingdom from one, and give it to another; needs explication: for it may be well, and ill understood; it may be true, and it may be false.* I make no question but it may be, and is false: but I would fain see the Explication by which it may be true. This it is: *The Pope indeed may, if it be necessary for the good of Souls, take the Kingdom from one; but, if he admonish him before, if he give him time to repent, if he find him pernicious and incorrigible.* May he so? Why then your opinion, for all your *Buts*, and *Is*s, is pernicious, and you incorrigible, good *Bellarmin*. What's this to say, but that he cannot steal his Kingdom in the dark, but may rob him of it in broad day light? This Admonition and Space of Repentance is in other words: The Pope must first say to the King; look you, I deal fairly above-board, and give you notice before-hand, that if you do not do as I would have you within such a time, it may be a month or two, it may be so many hours (for this space of *Bellarmin's* is, for ought I see, at the Popes appointing too) I will turn you a grazing, and provide my good people another King.

I see no such matter of substance in these formalities, but that they might be well enough spar'd, if conveniently they could. But they are a sort of impudent things, which will thrust in whether the Pope will or no. For Kingdoms are no such inconsiderable trifles, that they can be pass'd away in private, and none know when or how. Except King *Phys* and King *Uss*, none ever yet stept into another mans Throne without warning, and I believe, none ever will. Does *Bellarmin* think it can happen in the world, that there should be a King so tame, that without more knowledge of the matter, as soon as a sentence of Deposition is brought, should quietly submit, and turn private man, and enquire no farther. Kings are more inquisitive then so, and stand more upon their terms, and look to be better satisfi'd. And though they did not, Subjects who have sworn Fealty, have a little curiosity in them, and will be asking why, and by what necessity they must change Lords, and obey *Peter*, who have sworn to *Paul*. There goes time to all this, for nothing will come of it till all parties be agreed. Now *Bellarmin* requires no more to make his sentence just, nor
so

so much, as nature will force upon him, let it be never so unjust. Of necessity there must intervene more time in the change of Kings, then he requires to his admonition and space of repentance. So that his Explication amounts in short to this: The sentence were unjust, if it requir'd things should pass in such a manner, in which 'tis impossible they should pass; but very just, if things be so done, as they must be done, in spite of sentence, or whatever else to the contrary; which is certainly a very trim Explication, and alters the Proposition wonderfully for the better. We cannot put so much as a Tenant out, without warning, and he would perswade us, we are much beholding to his Explication, for requiring as much Ceremony in the change of a Kingdom, as a Farm.

And yet when all is done, I cannot tell whether he be in earnest or no, and think these Formalities so indispensably necessary, that a King cannot be depos'd without them. It is hard to say, what Plenitude of Power may do, and I doubt, he would not be well look'r on, who should go about to fix its bounds. But besides that, a Case may happen, where a King cannot repent, though he would, or at least, make amends by repentance: A Case may happen, where he will not repent, nor believe he hath reason so to do. *Bellarmino* would perswade us, *Ozias* in the Old Law was depos'd for Leprosie. What! did the High Priest admonish him to repent of his Leprosie, and not proceed to Deposition, till after convenient patience with him, he found him incorrigible in his Leprosie? *Ozias* might, and 'tis likely did repent the fault for which he was struck with Leprosie, but unless his repentance could make him clean again, as to the matter of Deposition, he had as good ne'r repented at all: for he vvas, according to *Bellarmino*, depos'd, for what no repentance could cure. Again, in the New Law, he would make us believe, *Chilperick* vvas depos'd for insufficiency. Did the Pope admonish him to repent the grievous fault of having so little wvit, and allow him time to provide himself of better brains, and better organs, and when he found him incorrigible, and all perswasion lost upon him, and that, say the Pope vwhat he could, he would not do vwhat he could not do, then at last after fruitless and long deluded patience cast him off? Wherefore though *Bellarmino* do require such Formalities as cannot conveniently be spared, yet possibly he may not think their necessity so absolute, as that the Deposition should be void if they concur not. But let him think vwhat he pleases, vvhile vwith all his insignificant Buts, he preserves this substance, that a King may be depos'd,

deposed, if instead of three, he require three hundred Ceremonies, the opinion is still inconsistent vvith Civil Government. And for our Case in particular, our Sovereign does not think fit to repent vvhat *Bellarmino* calls Heresie and a deposing fault, for this reason, because he does not think it a fault, and is for that reason very like to be incorrigible in it too; and vvhoever thinks he may therefore be deposed, is himself pernicious, and not to be endured in his Dominions.

And so much for the taking avvay *But*. For the giving *But*, he tels us, *The Pope may also give the Kingdom to another, yet not at pleasure, to whom he thinks fit, for so indeed Kings were but precarious Kings. But He is ty'd to the order of Justice, whether Succession or Election take place, or if there be none can claim, then to him whom reason prefers.* I fear the truth of this may be questioned. Sure I am that vvhen *Q. Elizabeth* vvvas deposed, and her Kingdom given to the *Spaniard*, there vvwere better Titles afoot in the vvorld, then *K. Philips*. Thanks be to God, the Throne of *England* has not been vacant, and the Popes reason never troubled to fill it. When Kingdoms are expos'd to prey, 'tis catch that catch can. I see no great order of Justice in that. But suppose it vvwere true, vvhat signifies this order of Justice? and vvhat bar to the Popes pleasure in Succession or Election? If the next Heir, or next Elect be a man, vvho pleases not the Pope, I suppose he must be pass'd by, and so as many as offer, till they come at last to some body who is *rectus in Curia*. For the first might stand as vvell as any of these, vvho, I conceive, are all in the number of those vvho cannot claim; and then vvhat does Succession or Election hinder, but the Pope still gives at pleasure, since none shall succeed or be elected, but vvhom he pleases? Again, vvhat difference betvvixt giving a Kingdom to vvhom the Pope pleases, and to vvhom Reason, meaning the Popes Reason, prefers? Preference of Reason is nothing in the vvorld; but that the Pope pleases to think it fitter this man should be prefer'd, then the other. So that *Election* and *Succession* and *Reason*, are nothing in truth but the *Popes Pleasure*, and all that *Bellarmino* affords us, is a meer sound of vvords vvwhich signifie nothing, and if they did, vvwere nothing to purpose neither. For vve are all this vvwhile beside the Cushion.

It makes nothing, I think, to the justification of a Robbery, that the prey vvvas equally shared; and vvhen a King is dethroned, he is as much dethroned, if he be succeeded by the next heir as by a stranger; neither do I believe, he is much concern'd vvho comes next upon the Stage, vvhen his ovvn part is ended. Our Question

at present is, whether Kings in *Bellarmin's* doctrine be only precarious Kings. By the way Precarious is not very currant *English*; I think we should call it holding at will, or pleasure, or if you will coyn a new word, Tenure by Intreaty. But however let us keep our Authors word. *Barclay* objects that *Bellarmin* makes Kings precarious, because he allows the Pope to take away and give Kingdoms, and this whenever he has a mind, as being sole judge in the case. *Bellarmin* answers, that Kings were indeed Precarious, if their Kingdoms could be dispos'd of at pleasure, but because the Pope is ty'd to the order of Justice in that point, they are not precarious. As if *Barclay* insisted on that, or thought their being Precarious depended on that disposition. The Son in defence of his Father laughs at that notion of Precarious, and rightly observes that Precarious is not said with relation to him that gives, but him that takes away. 'Tis the power of revocation, if that word fit him vvho never gave, plac'd in the Pope, the power of deposing when the Pope thinks fit, which makes a King precarious, let the Kingdom be dispos'd how 'twill afterwards, the King is still precarious, purely Tenant at vwill.

But pray tell me truly. Do you in earnest find any thing in these healing *Buts* of *Bellarmin*, which makes his opinion a jot sounder then the *Canonists*; a jot safer for Princes, or more dutiful for Subjects? For my part I profess seriously I find nothing, unless non-sence will do the feat. There is a little more non-sence in this opinion then the other, and if that be a security for Princes, it would do vvell if the vvorld ran mad as fast as it could. While men are in their wits, they vvill go near to think never a Barrel better Herring.

Just such work he makes vvith *Barclay's* next Proposition, which was this: To judge, when 'tis necessary for the good of Souls, that a King be depos'd, belongs only to the Pope, and none is to question his Judgment. This he saies is like the former, and if it be ill understood, is false, but rightly understood is true, but then concludes not what *Barclay* would have it. Now am I terribly afraid that ill understood is as much in *Bellarmin's* language, as truly understood, or so as it truly signifies, and rightly understood means understood otherwise then as it signifies. For else I cannot for my heart see but if the Pope may depose when there is necessity, and judge when this necessity happens, and none must call his judgment in question, and these words mean as they sound, Kings are purely Tenants at will, and the Pope may depose them whenever he pleases to judge it necessary, which is what *Barclay* would conclude. What is the good meaning in which vve must rightly understand it? Why, It does indeed belong to the Pope, saies he, to judge whether it be necessary a King should be depriv'd of his Kingdom. Very well! So *Barclay* understood it, and so *Bellarmin* himself understands it. Why

does it not conclude then, that Princes may be depos'd at pleasure ? Because of another *But*. *But*, saies he, *it does not belong to the Pope to feign necessities at pleasure, or serve his passions under pretence of necessity.*

Bellarmin is as unlucky at his *Buts*, as *Distinctions*. Whoever said it belong'd to the Pope to feign necessities ? and yet it may be said as truly as that Deposing belongs to him. If *Bellarmin* could give good security the Pope should never do more then belong'd to him; there might be something in it: but if that were so, we should not have heard so much of this Deposing power, for that does not belong to him neither. But belong, or not belong, he may feign a necessity by passion, or he may judge that necessary which is not so by mistake; and if he does so, 'tis all one as if he did not feign, and not mistake, when neither Prince, nor any body else, is allow'd to judge whether he feign or no. Unless the Pope be supposed infallible in sincerity too, and that he will alwaies declare, This man I depose upon a true, and that upon a feigned necessity. But if we must take all he saies is necessary, to be truly necessary, Kings may be depos'd at pleasure, for he may say so when he pleases. Marry if other people must see this necessity as well as himself; all good subjects will tell him there neither is nor can be any necessity why a King should be depos'd. I, but, saies *Bellarmin*, *because this is a matter of great importance, and the necessity must be manifest and seen, therefore Popes ordinarily do these things in Synods of Bishops, or Consistories of Cardinals, shewing his reasons and taking their consents.* Yes sure, 'tis a matter of great importance, too great to be thus trifled with. Manifest quotha! I beseech you to whom must this necessity be manifest? If to any besides himself; why 'tis manifest to all good Subjects, that there neither is, nor ever was, nor ever shall or can be any such necessity, and 'tis manifest they are not good Subjects who think otherwise. But if He alone be Judge of the manifest as well as the necessary, his command without more ado is evidence enough that 'tis manifest to Him, it ought be commanded. And I hope he can as easily and as soon say *'Tis manifest*, as *'Tis necessary*.

Then for his *Synods* and *Consistories*, I wonder what they are for, Does he consult with them, too, whether that be to be done of which there is a necessity, and this necessity seen and manifest? He may consult the *How*, but the *Whether* is a wise point of consultation, if it be already manifest. Or is it perhaps to be made manifest by the consultation? If so, the case is not so clear as *Bellarmin* pretends, and other persons, more concern'd then his *Synods* and *Consistories*, have reason to expect it should be made manifest to them too, as well as the other. Besides, He who makes what Bishops and Cardinals he pleases, and of such as he makes consults with whom he pleases, has wit enough sure to chuse such, of whom he may be certain before-hand

hand, they will oppose nothing which he shall propose. Indeed if by his Synods he meant General Councils, there might be more difficulty. The Bishops of The Prince concern'd, and of those Princes who were leagu'd with him, would go neer to speak in his behalf. Else Synod in his language imports no more then a company of Bishops, perhaps not so much, chosen according to the Popes pleasure. And yet even thus much is more then he thinks necessary too. He saies the Pope ordinarily does thus, but if he will do otherwise, He may for any thing *Bellarmin* saies to the contrary. And the truth is 'tis not to be expected but he will. To depose a King is not every daies work. 'Tis an extraordinary case, and in extraordinary cases there may be extraordinary proceedings. However the Pope is still Judge of this, as of all the rest, and so when all is done we are purely at the Popes pleasure for all.

There is a brace more of Volunteers, which though they be resolute enough, and venture on any thing, let it be never so desperate, and let them have never so little to do with it, yet *Bellarmin* spares them as much as he can, and keeps them in reserve for dead-lists, and then, which often happens, they never fail him. One is *De Facto*, and *De Jure*. This is a distinction good enough in it self, but as he uses it only at a pinch, and when he has nothing else to say, it looks still like a piece of good stuff hung in a place which it will not fit. For example, *Gregory the Great* writing of a certain Law, which for his own part he dislik'd, and thought unjust, but yet publish'd, as he was commanded by the Emperour; speaks thus: *I being subject to your command, have caused the Law to be sent into several parts, and because the Law agrees not with God Omnipotent, I have by my Letter informed my Serene Lords. Wherefore I have in both done what I ought, obey'd the Emperour, and not conceal'd what I thought for God.* Now I should think that to publish an unjust Law, and where the Injustice concern'd the service of God and liberty of the Church, as was here the case, without the excuse which bears out a Subject, who is not to examine but obey the commands of his Superiour, is to do an unjust thing, and for which now adaies Force would hardly pass for an excuse. If any encroachment be thought made upon the Church in our times, the language is presently, *I will die first, I will suffer Martyrdom, before the Cause of God, and Ecclesiastical immunity shall suffer by my means.* I take this Pope to have been a man of as much zeal as those who use this language, and acknowledg'd to be so, and since he submitted to a bare command, he either thought that command had power to oblige him, or he acted against his Conscience without obligation. Wherefore plainly he thought himself *De Jure* subject, or *De facto* he did very ill.

For all that, I, says *Bellarmin*, say this obedience was forc't, *de Facto*,

not de Jure. Why then I think you may say any thing. Pray consider again good *Bellarmin*. Does not he say, he did but what he ought? *Uerobiq; quod debui exolvi.* Does not what I ought, signifie, what is my duty? and does *Duty* signifie *Force* with you? Sure as can be a Cardinal may do what he pleases. If he will have words signifie otherwise then they do, there is no contesting. Otherwise, if the Pope were subject *de Facto* only, not *de Jure*, the Emperour had no Right to command him, and if the Emperour had no Right to command, the Pope had no obligation to obey, and then he ought have done quite the contrary (for *Force* is no excuse for injustice) and what *I ought* signifies what *I ought not*, which we dull men should never have suspected. Allow us but the same liberty though, and it shall be shamfully hard for which we will not make a shift to say some thing. That Chalk is blew, for example, which we will say is white only *de Facto*, but blew *de Jure*. That the Fire burns *de Facto*, but only warms *de Jure*. That *Bellarmin* is a great Scholler *de Facto*, but *de Jure* none at all. I know I speak impertinently, but I meant to do so, and yet think I speak as pertinently as he who saies *Duty* is only duty *de Facto*, but *de Jure* not duty. He might ee'n as well have made use of his *Indirect* here too, and said the Pope was subject only *Indirectly*, but was not subject *Directly*, or contrariwise, for 'tis all one. Young Sophisters sometimes when they are put to it, and know not how to shift off an Argument, find something or other which sounds like a distinction, no matter what it signifies, and whether any thing or nothing, so it serve turn for the present, And I doubt he remembered the trick a little too long.

But Subjection to Princes being prov'd by Examples, and Commands, This is the Reserve for Examples, when they are ill-natur'd, and will not be turn'd off otherwise. For Commands there is another common place, which now 'tis known is nothing, but he was a very subtle man sure that first discovered it. It consists in distinguishing the same man into a Prince, and a not-Prince, and then interpreting all obedience we find commanded, belongs to the Prince only, the not-Prince has no share in it. This distinction, because it is indeed a little hard, they attribute to the Omnipotent power of the Pope, and say that the Prince, till he be deposed, is a Prince, but afterwards no Prince; and because it still falls short, for the man governs and lives like a Prince still, they etch it out with its fellow distinction, and say he is no Prince *de Jure*, though he be *de Facto*. And now bring 'em as many and as plain places for obedience as you will, 'tis the easiest thing in the world to get cleer of them; Bring Scripture, bring Fathers that a Prince is to be obey'd; True, say they, while he is a Prince, but now he is no longer a Prince.

Princes in my opinion have hard luck to stand in the Popes way, and become the first sad examples of his Omnipotence; otherwise there is no Law of God or Man which may not be overturn'd as easily by the same engine. For he may as soon and as well declare, That Wife to be no Wife, That Man to be no Man, and make Adultery and Murther lawful, as that King to be no King, and make Rebellion innocent. There would not want as likely pretences for the one as the other, if people would but look after them. For Example, A Man is a rational Creature, who acts unreasonably disclaims his nature, and may be dispatch'd without contradicting the Divine Law, which forbids men to be kill'd while they are men, but he by the Popes declaration is no man. As much may be found out for the Wife, as much for Estates, as much for every thing. For there neither is nor can be any stronger title to any thing then the Law of God, and that the King has to his Kingdom, and if that will not do, nothing will. This is just *Montalto*. Sin but enough and you trapan the Devil, and become vertuous even by being wicked. To refuse obedience to a King is with them a crime, and a crime which deserves damnation; marry to Un-king him, and deny there is any obedience due to him, is an innocent thing. As if taking his Power quite away, were not a greater disobedience then to resist it. A particular disobedience may have a particular, and sometimes excusable cause; but a general disobedience, such as leaves them no longer any Power to command, is of all disobedience the greatest, most inexcusable in it self, and most contrary to the Divine Law. And yet he would perswade us, we sin, if we obey not a particular, perhaps trifling Command, but if we take away Power and all, we are very honest men. Whereas in truth, when I disobey a Power which I acknowledge, perhaps I wrong my self most, for I do not my duty; but when I no longer acknowledge my Princes Power, I do him as well as my self the greatest wrong I can; and yet this greatest wrong with *Bellarmino* is no wrong.

These are the healing Distinctions which *Bellarmino* applies to his Doctrine, and by which the sound Deposing is to be distinguished from the unsound Deposing. If you find any such sovereign vertue in them, I shall be glad to learn it. But for our part, we think Deposing an incurable disease, a poyson for which there is no Antidote. Disguise it how you will, while it remains Deposing, 'tis alike intolerable, & alike inconsistent wth the safety of Princes, and duty of Subjects. Call the Power indirect, call it in Temporals, not temporal, as long as 'tis Power, and can do the feat, no honest ear can hear it. Tell us of admonition, and space of repentance; tell us of Synods and Consistories; of disposing the prey according to Justice; of not feigning necessities; tell us what you will, while you tell us Deposing is good Doctrine, we cannot

cannot believe you good Subjects. Bring a thousand Schoolmen, and ten thousand subtilties, against them all we will stand by our honest Parliament Doctrine, *That the Crown of England is and alwayes has been free, and subject immediately to God, and none other*, and who refuses his Fellowship in that Doctrine, I know not, with what face he can pretend to a Fellowship in any thing else.

But the truth is, I do not see that *Bellarmino* with all his art does so much as guild the bitter Pill, or make it a jot less nauseous. For what is the very worst the Canonists say? Take their opinion in his own expressions, and he says all they say, and in terms as positive, and as comprehensive. Take *Carerius*, or whoever is the highest flyer among those I sent you at first, and the worst is but this: *That the Pope has jurisdiction over all things both spiritual and temporal throughout the world; that he may absolve Subjects from the Oath of Allegiance; Depose Kings; and transfer their Dominions from one line to another.* And which of this worst does *Bellarmino* with his proper Distinctions, and cautious Buts, deny? 'Tis true, they call his Power *Direct*, and *Bellarmino* *Indirect*, but what matter is it how they are called, if one can do as much as the other? And I would fain know, what they can do with their *Direct*, which he cannot with his *Indirect*. 'Tis true, they make but one absolute Monarch of the world, and all the rest but arbitrary Lieutenants; and *Bellarmino* calls them true Kings, but makes them as much subject as if they were but Lieutenants. Were Kings perswaded once it were their duty to resign at the Popes command, they would themselves make no difficulty to call and think him their supreme Lord. 'Tis only in consideration of the scurvy consequence which would follow, *viz.* that being supreme and absolute Lord, he might dispose of his own as he thought fit, that they refuse to give him that Title. Now *Bellarmino* sticks to the consequence, which is all the mischief, and makes the Pope do all that a supreme Monarch could do, and thinks all is well if he do not call him so, whenas if he could do what *Bellarmino* would have him, he truly were supreme Monarch, and *Bellarmino* might make no bones to call him by his proper name.

The truth is, 'twould anger any King at heart, to be put out of his Kingdom, and not so much as know why, nay, while on the contrary he is fully perswaded he cannot be dispossessed, even by those who dispossess him. If a Canonist come and tell him, Sir, you must descend, the Pope your supreme Lord has so commanded: If he believe the Canonist, he understands how a superior Power is to be obey'd, and submits as a Lieutenant, when his Commission is recalled. But if *Bellarmino* come and tell him, you are now a private man, the Pope has so declared: Without doubt, he will reply, what if he have? Have not you your self told me that I am a true King, no Vassal of the Popes, but

supream in Temporals? Have not you told me, the Popes Power is only spiritual; and do you tell me now, I must give up my temporal Crown, to the command of a spiritual Authority? All this is true, quoth *Bellarmino*, but yet you must obey. What! must I obey one who cannot command in such thing? Yes, he can. 'Tis something hard for you to understand who are no Scholar; you can understand what 'tis to obey, and that is enough for you; the rest belongs to us of the Trade. In my conscience, this would sooner put a man out of his wits, then out of his Kingdom, and who kept his wits, I believe, would go near to keep his Kingdom too.

In fine, the sum total of the Canonists account is but this: That the Pope by reason of his absolute supream Authority in all things, is not to be questioned, but obey'd in whatever he commands. And if *Bellarmino* go less in substance, whatever he do in words, I am mistaken. Nay, how much short is he, even in words, when he tells *Barclay*, C. 17. *That if the spiritual Prince happen to abuse his Power, by excommunicating a temporal Prince unjustly, or absolving his Subjects from their obedience without just cause, and so disturb the temporal Commonwealth: This were sin in the spiritual Prince, but yet that temporal Prince could not assume to himself the judgement of spiritual things, or judge the spiritual Prince, and much less depose him from his spiritual Seat.* This is worded in opposition to *Barclay*, who by the same Argument which *Bellarmino* brings for the Deposition of Princes, proves that they may as well depose Popes. But if this do not signifie, that right or wrong the Pope is always to be obey'd, I understand it not. For Deposition, according to him, is a spiritual thing, an act of spiritual Power; to judge of this, a Prince must not assume to himself, no not in case of Injustice. And if he must not question, what remains but to obey it, and this in all Cases, just or unjust? Let the boldest Canonist that is out-go this if he can.

Upon the whole, I see no other difference betwixt the two opinions, but that one is abominable false, and the other abominable false, and a bominable full of non-sense besides. They with one bold untruth subject all Princes to the Pope, and for the rest discourse at least consequently. Were their Principle true, all would follow which they say. He makes Princes as much subject as they, and when he has done, calls them true sovereign Princes, and discourses, so that no part hangs together. Every one falls together by the ears with his fellow, and makes such mad work, that a body can understand nothing of it, but that 'tis false. Consider a little what he teaches in his *Rom. Pont.* against these Canonists: *That Christ or the Christian Law, deprives none of the Right and Dominion he had before; that otherwise Christianity would be injurious, and a wrong instead of a benefit, and therefore Christian Kings and Emperors acknowledge no Superior in Temporals, but are true and supream Princes*

Princes in their own Kingdoms. Again, *That Christ our Lord has distinguished the Acts, Offices, and Dignities of Popes and Emperors, that one should not presume to meddle with the Rights of the other,* and a great deal more to this purpose. But that strange things happen in the world now and then, one would not suspect that these things and Deposition should both be taught by one man, and that man a friend of the Popes. Sure if I were Pope, I should not think my self much oblig'd by him, who gives me a Power to do injuries.

But with what Distinction-sodder shall we ever cement these things? Does a King lose nothing, when he loses his Kingdom? Is nothing taken away, when all is gone? Is he depriv'd of no Right, who is depriv'd of the Right to reign? Is it no injury to be turn'd out of a Throne, to be forc't to change Purple for Rags, and languish out a despised life in helpless Beggary? Do Christian Princes acknowledge no Superior in Temporals; if they acknowledge one, at whose command they must quit their Temporals? By the way, we are at our Superior in Temporals again, with the meaning of which, for my late bad success, I dare not meddle. It signifies you know, ee'n what you please. But let it signifie what it will, I am sure no Distinction can hinder, but who has Power to command in Temporals, is Superior in Temporals. And he would make us believe at the same time, both that Christian Princes know none such, and yet do know a certain Person who can command away their Temporals from them. To make both these true at once, is, me thinks, a pretty confident undertaking.

Then again, what means this, that the two Powers are distinct, and one not to meddle with the Rights of the other? I am sure, he does not mean, that the same Person cannot have and exercise both, because then the Bishop of *Rome* could not be a temporal Prince. Now I understand how in that case the Powers are distinct in themselves, notwithstanding they are united in one Person, because that one Person commands temporal things in vertue of one power, and Spiritual in vertue of another, which certainly he may do who has both. But when there is but one Power extended to both kind of actions, The powers certainly are then confounded, if they can be confounded at all. For what can confounding, or mixing in this case signifie, but making one of two, which one shall have the vertue of both? So liquors, so every thing that I know in the world, are blended or confounded together. Wherefore 'tis *Bellarmin*, not the *Canonists*, who truly confounds these Powers. They make them two, but say the Pope has both. *Bellarmin* saies, he has but one, and that the Spiritual only; but would have this one Spiritual Power command both in Spirituals and Temporals. Which is of two, to make one third Power, neither wholly Spiritual, because it extends to Temporals, nor wholly Temporal,

poral, because it acts in Spirituals, but equivalent to both. And if this be not to confound the two Powers, and make one of these two which he saies Christ would have divided, I would be glad to learn what is, and what other way they can be confounded. And yet the jest is even while he does this, he presses the confusion of the Powers as a great inconvenience upon the *Canonists*, who are not altogether so faulty as himself, and can extricate their Doctrine a great deal better. In two words, either he confounds the Powers, and then he disobeyes Christ, who, he saies, would have them kept asunder; or he does not, and then he disobeyes him in permitting one to meddle with the rights of the other. For certainly 'tis the right of the Temporal power to command the Subjects to that power, and require their allegiance and service: And to take away these Subjects and this Allegiance, is to meddle and that very far too, vvith what belongs to the right of another.

The Truth is, these Tricks turn a question of as great importance as any in the world, into pure words and illusion. The vvorld is in suspence about the decision of this great Question, concerning the independent Sovereignty of the two Powers, and how that command in the Gospel, *Reddite quæ sunt Cæsaris Cæsari, & quæ sunt Dei Deo*, should be obey'd. All the learning of ten Ages teach, the powers were distinguisht by Christ, one given to the Bishop, the other to the Prince. The *Canonists*, and they but some, and all late men, teach they were given both to the Pope. This third indirect Party coming to settle a point of this importance, profess at first, that the Powers truly are, as Christ commanded they should be, distinct, and the Pope for his share has the Spiritual only. Would not any man think now the business decided, and that we had no more to do but obey our Prince in Temporals, and Bishop, or, if you will Pope (for I will not meddle with that question) in Spirituals, and there's an end?

Why this 'tis to be illiterate, says *Bellarmin*, and not understand distinction. The Popes power is only Spiritual, but yet this Spiritual power indirectly, and for the good of Souls, virtually, and by means of some other proprieties of speech, extends likewise to Temporals, and may dispose of Kingdoms as it sees fit. Why then call it Temporal in the name of God, if it can dispose of Temporals, and say the Pope is Universal Monarch if he be so, and stand to it. Yes we do stand to it, replies *Bellarmin*, but we love to speak properly, and do not call the Pope Universal Monarch, though he can dispose of all the Kingdoms of the World, because he does it not in vertue of a Temporal power, but by a spiritual working, and after an indirect manner. Hang the manner how he does it, if he can do it. What has the World to do with these mannerly tricks? A King is well help up, who after he is dispossess'd, comes to understand

that this came about after another fashion, and in another manner then he was aware of.

Well! but are you for the *Canonists*, or against them? why truly *I am for them, and I am not for them*. And our Question, What must be said to that? Must we obey our King or the Pope? This is what the world looks after. Why, according to one half of the resolution, which says Princes are supream in Temporals, and have in them no Superiour, *we must obey our King: according to the other half*, which saies a power vvhich is only Spiritual can dispose of Temporals too, *we must obey the Pope*. But how must I do with this *Licet* and *non Licet*? must I cut my self in two, and list a Leg and an Arm under one, a Thumb and a Shoulder under the other, and if I happen to meet in the battle fight my King-self against my Pope-self.

Because this is something difficult, and they are men of reason, I imagine they would condescend a little in this point, and let me remain entire. As long as the answer is divided 'tis well enough. But then I must chuse the right half. That's it I would be at. Pray tell me then, must whole I take the Spiritual, or the Temporal half. Why, the truth is *you must take the Spiritual half*. *Parasits and Flatterers may tell you otherwise. But this is the truth of the story*. Why then to what purpose all this illusion of my Princes Sovereignty, and Independency, when after all he is neither Sovereign nor Independent? To what purpose this bustle against the *Canonists*, only to say the same thing at last, but with more ado. Could you not have plainly told me at first what I must trust to, and spared the trapan of so many useles disguises? The result of all your Spiritualls, and Indirects, and good of Souls, and whatever else, is in short, I must obey the Pope against my Prince; only I must in spight of all sence believe my Prince is a true and Sovereign King, and has no Superiour in Temporals, and the Pope no power but Spiritual, and so besides a Traytor and a Rebel, become senseless, and a block into the bargain.

Here's your fine opinion, of which you make such a Mystery, and are so shy to discover your thoughts. Come; come; leave dodging, and deal above-board. Answer me these things, and shew me that *Bel-larmin* speaks sence, and sence not injurious to Government, and the safety of Princes; or disclaim him plainly as you have the *Canonists*. 'Tis at your choice to do what you will; but do one, and that effectually; or take notice I tell you I will believe for the future your Church is a wicked Church, absolutely inconsistent with Civil Government, and has not one sound member in her, no not one. Put me not off with formalities, and think to scape with telling me, this doctrine belongs not to your Church as a Church, and that only the Material men hold it. 'Tis the material men I only care for at present.

We

We converse not with your *formal Church*, vve hear and see, and deal with *Material men*. These are they can do us good or harm, and 'tis but reason we should know vvhat to expect from them. *Formalities* are ayry things, no rope can catch them: but *Material men* you know maye be suspended, and vvhen they are found guilty, and have no hopes of reprieve but in the innocence of their *formalities*, I doubt it goes hard vvith them.

In two vvords, *clear your selves from an imputation*, which you have brought upon your selves, or *confess you cannot be cleer'd*; and remember that *silence is a confession*, and so I shall take it, as all Justice in the world does, and believe it vvas not the wickedness of the *Canonists* opinion which made you disclaim it, but because that wickedness came clad in fence, and people could understand it. But the same wickedness disguis'd in non-fence is a Darling. So that your *Pique* was not to the wicked, but the fence: make it but non-sensical enough, and let it be never so wicked you are for it. I bar *Sophistry* too, and unintelligible Subtleties. Let your Schollers keep their *riddle me riddle me* to themselves. I shall understand the *Talmud* as soon, as what you call *Terms of Art*, meaning, I suppose, the Art of keeping things from being understood; The Art of talking so that no body shall know whether you say *I*, or *No*. But I understand what 'tis to *Command and Obey*.

And to bring the whole to a short plain Issue, I ask, *If it should happen the Pope should command you to disobey your King, and the King command you to disobey the Pope, by whom will you stand?* And I expect an Answer as plain as my Question. I declare too, because I will not turn our dispute into a controversie of Religion, nor meddle with the Popes *Spiritual power*, that I mean only of *Temporal commands*, of such commands wherein you have no reason, nor doubt; but you ought obey the King, but only because the Pope commands the contrary. Give me a direct Answer to this, for I tell you I bar *Indirects*, and the business is done. If you will obey your King, you are an honest man, and have disclaim'd *Bellarmin* as well as the *Canonists*: If the Pope, you must make out, if you can, *how he is a good Subject who refuses to obey his Prince*. The business being now in a very narrow compass, and perceptible by every body, there I leave it, with this Advertisment, *that upon your Answer depend the thoughts I shall have of your Church, or, if you will, men of your Church*. According as you Answer *I*, or *No*, I shall believe you consistent, or not consistent with Government. There I began, and there I end. I hope you will give me no occasion to chang my thoughts of you; for truly 'twould grieve me if I could not, with as much satisfaction to my Judgment as Inclination, own the title of,

Your, &c.

FRIEND,

ME thinks you deal roughly for a *Friend*. If I were as brisk as you, here, would be brave doings. What a bustle do you keep with me, with *Bellarmino*, and the *Church*? and all, because I desir'd to keep my thoughts to my self. Truly I thought *silence* no such hainous crime. I have known many repent of speaking, but few of holding their tongues. But for my self you may deal as you please twenty to one but I may at some time or other find occasion to cry quittance with you, and then I expect you should allow me the liberty you take. But *Bellarmino*! what harm has he done you, to incur your indignation so highly? Is he the only man who maintains the Indirect Power? And if he were, can you not disprove him fairly, and let your bitterness alone? The *Church* too! Pray, what is she concern'd whether I do as you would have me or no? Can no Member of her Communion displease you, but she presently must be brought in? She is this, and she is that, if I do not what I have no mind, and, for all your earnestness, I fear no reason to do. But you have got an eye of me, and you follow it. You know I value the *Church* above my self, and that I will never agree she should be ill thought of, if I can help it. Indeed I was in hope to have cut the Thread, and answered so, as might please you, and displease no body else: But since 'twill not be, and that there is no way to clear her from those blemishes, which your capricious Jealousie has cast upon her, but by forcing my own inclinations, I think my self oblig'd rather to expose my self to other mens censures, then leave her expos'd to yours. If any man dislike my resolution, I entreat him for one moment to make my case his own, and consider what he would do, so loudly and so smartly challenged, and what duty requires he should do, when on the one side the Churches reputation is at stake, on the other the quiet, it may be credit of particulars. If he doubt which side to take, I must needs think, *he has less respect for his mother then becomes a good child*. For my part, I am perswaded otherwise.

Well! But you will not be satisfi'd unless I speak plainly. Would I knew whether you will be satisfi'd if I do. For I tell you truly, I begin to be as jealous of your earnestness, as you of my reservedness. If reason would have satisfi'd you, I think you might have been satisfi'd before this time. However I will venture to make one experiment more, and try what I can do with you by and by. If you be in earnest, and that plain dealing will do it, I shall prevail at last. For I will tell you, and that very plainly, more then you ask. You shall know not only what I think, but why I have been thus backward to tell you what I think. I will frankly discover all my policy, which makes you so merry, peradventure to be as much laugh'd at for my simplicity: but however, you shall have no cause of jealousy of what I harbour in my breast,

breast, when you know all I harbour there. But do not think I mean to be so merry as you are. I am in no such pleasant humour, and think the matter a little too serious. If you had spared some of your mirth, I believe 'twould have been ne'r a whit the worse. The meat might have been altogether as good, if the sauce had been less tart. But to our business.

You are still harping upon the *Church*. A worm of Jealousie is crept in, and will not out. You are still suspicious, *she forbids people from dealing freely in these matters*. I told you there was no such thing, and I tell you so again, at least that I know, and I tell you besides, *That had there been such a thing, and I known it, I would have dealt as sincerely with you, as Fisher with King James, told you so at first, and never medled so much as I have done*. But if you will know the true cause of my reservedness, know that you your self have a great share in it. You are all on fire, because I say not presently what pleases you. I suppose you do not imagine but there are men of tempers as hot as you, whom that will displease, which pleases you. Besides the Question is of a particular nature. It has been canvast heretofore with much animosity. The fire is not yet dead. It flames not indeed at present, because the fuel of occasion is taken away, but the heat lyes rak't up in mens hearts, and would easily break out again. I would not for all the world be he, who should blow this heat into a new flame. But for that, I conceive, my breath too faint, and inconsiderable. However, as I love not to meddle with hot men at all, so I would gladly be guilty of so much policy, as not to provoke hot men upon a hot subject. Whether I say, I or No, one hot side will be apt to take offence. Wherefore I thought it the best way to hold my tongue. Now your fantastical curiosity is not satisfi'd with this, but is as hot upon my silence, as others may be upon my speaking: And would perswade me, you play the *Friend* all the while. I hope you will send me the next time to stir a nest of Wasps, and make me believe it a point of Friendship.

However, I assure you, the *Church* has nothing to do with my silence, neither do I, or ever did apprehend any thing from her. The Church has other employment, then to look so low as I am, and besides, God forbid, that Innocence should not be safety enough for any of her Communion. All that I apprehend is the heat of private men, of those with whom I am like to meet and converse, and from whom I may chance hear twenty cross Questions. 'Twould vex me to have a man come to me, and say: *You Sir! Pray how long have you taught Divinity, or in what University taken degrees, who presume to handle so freely, men in reverence for their learning with all Divines, and all Universities? The world is at a fine pass, when a little pert confidence shall set up every pidler in learning, against those who have spent their lives in nothing else*. Again, You pass for a *Catholick*, and acknowledge, at least in words, *That the Pope is supream*.
Pastor.

Pastor. 'Tis done like a dutiful Child to go about to lessen your Father. The next time you write I hope you will leave him no power at all. I fore-see the next piece will be of *Antichrist*, and then there is hopes you may in time proceed to the *three Impostors*. 'Tis an *Heretical spirit* this, and beware of it. I may be in a froward humor when I hear this, and it may be return a froward answer; and then we fall out, and he tells every body he meets, *I am in a dangerous condition, tottering upon the very brink of perdition, and 'tis great luck if I scape the precipice.* Every body who hears this said, and that confidently, and gravely, will not hear what I can say for my self; or if they did, they are but few with whom the solemn outside will not carry it against a better reason than I shall be able to produce. And then I pass for *dangerous, or busie, or foolish* as they please to frame my character. My Friends begin to look askew at me, and all the sweetness of conversation, and innocent pleasure of hearty Friendship is lost. This would be wonderful uneasie to me, and if it should happen, as 'tis like enough, I should, whatever you do, think it a great inconvenience. In fine every man has his humor, and mine is not to make an enemy of so much as a *Cobler*, if I could keep him my Friend.

This is the reason why I so readily disclaim'd the *Canonists*, because *I meet with none who are like to give me any trouble about them.* And this is the reason why I was more reserv'd in the other opinion, because *I may meet with this trouble.* I hope you will not think this a reflexion upon my communion, as if they were more troublesom to their Neighbours than other folks. *Men are men of all communions, and hot men are hot men, and such are impatient that any perswasion they have wedded should be contradicted.* This is all the disquiet I foresaw and apprehended, and the great Policy with which you keep so much ado. And if it be Policy to think my thought quietly to my self, as I elsewhere told you, and not fall out with every man who thinks otherwise, nor give any man occasion to fall out with me; to think I have no commission to Reform every thing I dislike, but that there may and will be errors in the world, let me do what I can: I avow to you, I would have been a *Politician*, if you would have let me, and am very sorry you did not.

But now we are upon *Politics*, let me tell you one thing by the way. *You are a meer Mortal at Politics as well as your Neighbours.* What work do you make with the business of 88, and how sily do you make it pass for an effect only of *Heresie*? If you do in earnest believe so, I can tell who's the *Sir Pol.* But sure you understand things better, then not to know, *Pretence* is one thing, and *Cause* another. 'Tis true *Heresie* was pretended, and it may be was a partial cause too, of as much as the *Pope* did. But do you think the *King of Spain* was at all that charge purely upon the account of *Zeal*? Sure you do not think him so great a Saint. Or if you do, all the world knows 'twas *Interest of State*, not *Religion*, which

rais'd that Army, and set out that *Armada*. The *Queen* stood in the way of his great thoughts, and so crost his designs upon other mens dominions, that she made him unable to recover his own. This obstacle to his ambition he had a mind to remove; and *Religion* was no bad presence among his own Subjects, vvho vv ere and still are exceeding Zealous; but he so little valued it himself, that he would not so much as own it. And this a better *Politician* then you or I, *Grotius* in his History of the *Low Countries* has observed: *Some*, saies he, *would have had the war proclaimed by a Herald, but others thought the right of claim from the Popes sentence would make out but a lame Title.* And these it seems were the wiser, and carried it. See now what conceit the *Spaniards* themselves had of your *Politick Cause*, and no better had we in *England*. For though *Mendoza* had vainly boasted of I know not what affection of some principal men here towards the *Spaniard*, in all likelyhood to ingratiate his own diligence, yet whatever his thoughts were, saies *Grotius* again, *it appeared true afterwards that however English Catholics might differ in Religion, there was, none of them so imprudent as to trust their Lives and Fortunes to the undistinguishing sword of a Forreign Conquerour.* And yet they were at that time as much affected to the *Pope* as any people in the world, and thought as highly of his power. And for all that they did not think he had power to dispossess their *Sovereign*, and distinguish rightly betwixt Pretence of Religion, and Reason of Interest. I can assure you we are of the same mind still, and know an *Invader*, let him be never so much a *Catholic*, is an *Invader*, and, let him pretend vvhat he vvill, means to enslave those he *Invades*, and alwaies will. He that comes vvith a *Cross* in his mouth, and a *Sword* in his hand, vv e know vvhat he vvould be at, and shall never be so senceless to be diverted by vvhat he saies, from considering vvhat he vvould do. I tell you once for all, *we would fight as freely against the Pope as the Turk, if he come like a Turk in Arms; and you may easily believe me: for all Nations do it vvithout difficulty when there is occasion; French, Spaniards, Italians themselves have all had their turns.* Marry if he come like a *Pope*, to direct our feet in the ways of that peace, which *Christ* bequeath'd as a legacy to his Church, I for my part vvill fall down at his feet, and kiss them too, laugh you as much as you vvill. In the mean time I vvould advise you, as you do me, to let *Politics* alone, and not go about to perswade the vvorld, *Heresie* was the cause of a'l the danger of 88, vvhen if there had been no such thing, there had not been one Ship, or one Souldier the less. Had *Queen Elizabeth* been *Inquisition-proof* as much as *King Philip*, he vvould have done just as he did: For 'twas the enemy of *Spain*, and friend to *Holland*, not the enemy to the *Pope*, vvith vvhom he had the quarrel. Had the *Pope* himself been in her place, the *Pope* had been invaded as she vv as. And this I say not altogether by gues, for both he and his Father actually did invade

invade the Pope, and his Father take him prisoner too. But so much for your Politics, and my reservedness, of which I have now given you the very reason, and told you the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth.

As for *Bellarmin*, I wish you had spared some of your *smartness*. *He was a great man*, and if you would undertake to answer all that he has writ; peradventure you would go neer to find him so. Nay do but write on any, chuse what you think the easiest, Subject, as much as he has done of intricate matters, and if you do not somewhere or other give occasion of as much sport as you have made with him, I shall much marvel. A great piece of Mastery it is, out of so many Volumes, where 'tis impossible the Author should alwaies be equally attentive, to pick out a few lines, and turn them to *Burlesque*. If I had a mind to take his part against you, perhaps I could make it appear, *He is not altogether such an Ass as you would make him, even in this question*. For example, *You quarrel with him because, as you say, he forgets to explain what he means by Indirect where he first uses the word*. As if those against whom he then writ, did not understand it well enough, and need no explication. His notion pleases not you, and you say it is not the Notion of the world. Suppose it be not. *He writ to that part of the World which understood it in his Notion*. If they understand one another, what is't to you and me what words they use? Again, you say, *He makes no use of that word in the whole course of his Arguments*. What is it to purpose whether he did or no? It may be he had no occasion. But if you consider his Arguments, you will find they proceed all upon what he understands by *Indirect Power*, and that they are all along opposite to the *Canonists*, who maintain in the Pope a power properly *Temporal*, whereas he places in him only a *Spiritual Power*; and then endeavours by those Arguments to prove, that *supream Spiritual Power*, may in vertue of its being so, extend also in some cases to *Temporals*: which is in his language to be *Indirect*, and was so understood by those against whom he intended his Arguments. So that he is so far from forgetting, as you imagine, his *Indirect*, that he makes use of it and nothing else. More I could say in his behalf if I had a mind. But I mean not to engage for him. He has friends a great deal more learned than I, who can speak for him, when they think convenient. As you have ordered the matter I have enough to do to quit my self. However I mean now to endeavour it, and quit my self so, if I can; that I may hear no more of you. For I am very weary of being baited thus long at one stake, and will come no more there, if I can help it.

I tell you then I will stand by your *Parliament-Doctrine*, as much as you or any of his Majesties Subjects, and take it unkindly at your hands you should surmise I would do otherwise. That Parliament was a *Catholick Parliament*, if you remember, and might have put you in

mind,

mind, that *Catholicks* may be both good *Catholicks* and good *Englishmen*. 'Tis true, there may be *Traytors* of them, and those *Traytors* may disguise their *Treason* with the pretence of *Religion*, as who would not get as handsome a vizard as he could for so ugly a face? But 'tis plain, that their *Religion* has no inconsistency with their duty to their *King* and *Countrey*, when we see their *Religion* was no hindrance to them, for providing for the liberties of their *Countrey*, against the encroachments of pretended *Religion*. On the contrary, I conceive it more shameful, and more wicked for us, who persevere in the same *Faith*, to degenerate from the same *Loyalty*, then for men of other persuasions. But to go on: I disavow and detest the wicked and pernicious *Doctrine*, which teaches the deposition of *Kings*, whom I acknowledge to hold independently of *God*, and will be ready on all occasions to lay down my life in confirmation of this *Truth*; and when you please, will give under my hand, that 'tis new, false, erroneous, contrary to the *Word* of *God*, and several ways mischievous besides, and will never maintain any opinion to the contrary. I know not how you will relish this way of speaking, but I can assure you, 'tis a way in which wiser men then I, have walk't before me. But to give a direct Answer to the Question to which you have reduc't the whole, and which by the way, I am very glad you have confin'd to *Temporals*, (for I do not mean to be perswaded out of my *Religion* by your earnestness) I answer thus: That I will at all times, and in all occasions, stand by my *King*, against whatsoever *Power*, and under whatsoever pretences. And because you are particularly jealous of the *Pope*, I declare, I will stand by my *Sovereign*, and believe it my duty so to do, against the *Pope*, as firmly as against any other, as being fully perswaded, he has no *Power* Direct or Indirect, Virtual or Formal, or by whatever names it has or may be call'd, to depose or dispossess him of all or any part of his *Dominions*, or authorise his *Subjects* not to perform faithful obedience to him. And I absolutely disclaim all *Doctrine* to the contrary, by whomsoever maintained, and under whatsoever disguises. And if you distrust my word, I will pawn you my hopes of salvation, and swear all this in as ample manner as you can devise, provided, you keep within the bounds you have set, and intrench not upon *Spirituals*. For you desire I should deal plainly with you, and I must tell you plainly, I mean, by the Grace of *God*, to be as good a *Catholick*, as a *Subject*, and hope, I do you no harm by meaning to save my soul. Now if you be not satisfi'd, it is no fault of mine, and I must believe, say what I will or can, you are resolv'd not to be satisfi'd. Which if it be so, I am sorry with all my heart you have put me to so much fruitless trouble, for truly I could have spent my time something better then in washing the *Brick*.

But now I am in the humour of telling you all I know, let me tell you farther, I am not alone of this persuasion. Whenever you make it as seasonable for other people to speak their thoughts freely, as you have made it necessary for me, I do not think you will find many *Catholicks*,

who will leave you much ground of jealousy. At least I am sure of this, *That there is no Catholick, who may not remain as good a Catholick as the Pope himself, in the blunt phrase, and say as much as I do.* Those who will not, if there be any such, are not hindred by any, either *Doctrine, or Command* of the Church, but by *Principles*, which whether by the credit of the maintainers, or whatever flash their eyes are dazled, they mistake for more effectual than they are. Notwithstanding if you meet with any such, I freely consent, you *make as much sport with them as you will, and bar you no part of the pleasure, I doubt, you take even in your jealousy, and which, I fear, you would be loth to part with.* But, to my knowledge, there are who would gladly give you satisfaction in this Point, if you would receive it.

Pray permit me a little liberty too, and let me ask you a Question or two in my turn. You know, as well as I, *there are of us, who hold in this matter what displeases you, and there are who do not.* You who talk so much of *honesty and uprightness*, pray where is the honesty and the uprightness to treat us both alike, and give the honestest man that is, the portion of a Knaves? Do you think it a just thing, that one man should bear the burden of another mans faults, or that those Nations do well, who when any one offends, punish all his relations? You keep us all under the same discouragements, and yet know we do not all deserve it. You allow us no means to clear our innocence, such as you know are clear, and should we find a means ourselves, our case is still the same as if we were guilty. Honest or not honest, all is one with you. If you say, *You know not which are which, why do you not know it? You may when you please.* But since you do know that some, whoever they be, are innocent, those innocent men should rather bear out the guilty, then the guilty condemn the innocent. I think men of tender conscience would choose to let twenty guilty men scape, before they would let one innocent man suffer. At least in other cases, the Law does not condemn any man, because he is not known to be innocent, but frees him without more ado, unless upon sufficient proof he be in particular found guilty. With us 'tis otherwise: because some are perhaps but thought guilty, (for till it come to trial, that's all can be said) it takes hold of innocent and all. Nay, we are not admitted so much as to a trial, nor allow'd to plead Not-guilty, with any plea which shall be any way beneficial, and free him, who is found so, from any thing to which he is liable who is cast. In fine, You pretend, and endlessly pretend dissatisfaction, yet no satisfaction will be receiv'd from those who could, and gladly would give it. Whatever men be, to look upon them still as guilty, and keep them so, in spite of all they can do, to make out their innocence, and not suffer them to pass for other: In two vvords, To make men liable to punishment whether they will or no, and then punish them, is in my opinion something hard dealing. I am perswaded, you are sensible enough that This might be prest. But I forbear, and only vvish you to clear things as
vvell

well as I have done. You are so nice at receiving satisfaction, that I should be very sorry, you had this to object against me. I fear, I should have much ado to make your squeamishness believe otherwise, *but we were in love with severity, and resolved not to part with any pretence of it.*

As for me I think I have done my part, and so clear'd all vvho are perswaded as I am, *that if you continue your jealousie against us, 'tis very plain, you are jealous for some other reason then demerit in us.* And because you shall perceive I am in earnest, and speak, not only in force of your importunity, but according to the perswasion of my best little Judgement, I vvill go a little farther, and tell you vvhy I am thus perswaded. For I vvould not have you think, your *Arguments* alone have done the feat, and that being formerly either unsetled, or vvrong fixt, they have converted me: And yet I must frankly acknowledge, *I cannot answer them in the main, though if I had a mind to keep up the wrangling Ball, I could perhaps here and there pick out enough to give you sufficient trouble.* But I have always been of this Judgement, and you might perceive so much by the Relation I made of the *Arguments*; in vvhich I did not play the *Historian* so impartially, as not to discover sufficiently vvith vvhich part I sided. So much sharpness as I mingled vvith the Narrative, could not proceed from one *who thought well of the Arguments.* By the vvay, I now wish there had been less. For since you must know all, *that heat was indeed but counterfeited, a disguise I put on, in hopes to excuse my self from plainly discovering my own face.* Othervvise more modesty to learned men then my self, had been more suitable *both to manners and my humour,* and 'twas vvith regret I shew'd no more respect to them. But I thought there vvwas no great harm to speak a little freely of Books, vvwhose Authors are by death exempt from all sense of wrongs, and if they vvwere alive, perhaps would not take much offence at any thing I should say. But I perceive I must give over Policy. 'Tis a Trade in vvhich I am not skil'd, and thrives accordingly.

To acquaint you plainly then with what I harbour in my brest, I must profess that as far, as I can judge, *This Deposing doctrine, in whatever garments of distinctions clad, as much as 'tis pinn'd upon our Religion, is more inconsistent vvith our principles, then those of any other perswasion: so inconsistent, that were it once establisht for Catholic doctrine, instead of being an advantage to the Church, as they who favour it suppose, it would be the ruin of it.* One of our Principles is respect to the *Ancient Fathers*, which he that would take away, would do the Church very bad service. Every body knows what reverence we profess to those great lights, and what veneration we pay to their learning and vertues. What shall we say? *that they were ignorant of a doctrine, which is pretended was taught by Christ, they who understood what Christ taught so well, and defended it so zealously.* Can it be imagined *our new Schoolmen know more then these great men, who in de-*

*f*orce of Christianity, against opposers as subtle as any that have since appear'd, discover'd a learning, which for ought I perceive After-ages have more reason to admire, than think they can equal. But if they knew as much as they do now, it can be less suspected from their Vertue, that they would conceal their knowledge, and suppress a truth of this importance. I cannot readily fancy any thing more incredible, not to say a harsher word, than that a point of no less concern than the performance of our duty to God, and his Vicegerents, Kings, should lye dormant in breasts inspired with so much zeal, and enlightened with so much knowledge, for Ten whole ages, and at last break out, and surprize the world with a new-light. Nor do I see how it can be thought possible, without imputing either Ignorance or Dishonesty to those, who of all men in the world are farthest from the suspicion of either. I should be sorry to be, or see the Catholic, who should in good earnest think either imputable. And yet if they knew this doctrine and did not conceal it, we must of necessity have heard of it long before we did. Gregory the 7th. is the first unquestionable Author of it: For though a little more Antiquity be sometimes pretended, yet those pretences are in truth but weak, and little better then meer conjecture. All that I can imagin possible to be said in the case, is, that they had no occasion to declare their knowledge, but being busied with other controversies said not all they knew in this. But I fear this cannot be maintained. For they do often treat of both Powers, explain their natures, and settle their bounds. They tell us the one consists in constraint, the other in freedom; That one has to do with Sacrifice, and Sacraments, and Divine things, the other with Human: That one inflicts Corporal, the other Spiritual punishment, and the like. Was there no occasion all this while to have given one touch of this Direct and Indirect Power? one little hint at the distinction, if they had known it? Let them think so that please. For my part I conclude they knew it not; those who think otherwise may conclude if they please, that they would not teach what they knew, but conceal'd a point of Christian duty, and which they knew to be so: and so by seeking to justify they knew more than we can possibly tell they did, since they express it not themselves, call in question their vertue which we all know.

But yet bare silence is not the case. They teach the direct contrary. They teach there are none who can punish Kings but only God; that we for our parts are to obey even unjust and wicked Princes, and this because God has so commanded, whose secret, but yet just, Providence, places over us, as well Nero's as Constantins: That the Church has no sword but the Spiritual, which to extend to Temporals is Arrogance. He that can reconcile these, and twenty other of their express doctrines with the deposing Power, may never stick at any thing, or fear that Impossibility will ever stand in his way. In fine, They allow us no other disobedience then in case of commands contrary to what God has commanded before, and no other resistance, even in this case.

case, but of prayers, and tears. Put them to have known the efficacy of our distinction, and that it was lawful, while directly we are oblig'd, to pray like Christians, indirectly to fight like Turks, and they have directly cheated the world, and trapan'd the Church into many a severe Persecution, from which let them say what they will, she had force enough to have freed her self, if she had thought it lawful to use it. Primitive Christians themselves had the confidence to tell their Persecutors to their faces, they wanted not strength to revenge themselves, if they had thought the defence of their lives a just excuse for resisting their Prince, or the Sword a lawful instrument to introduce the Gospel. But they knew Religion was not to be establish'd by fighting, but preaching, and that Conquest is not the way to set up the Kingdom of Christ. If their Prince bad them fight against his Enemies, they did so: but if he himself became their Enemy, they chose, as was their duty, to die rather than fight against him.

The truth is, people may say and think as their fancy guides them, but Force is not the way to preserve or introduce true Religion. Falshood may need it, but it weakens Truth. Consider which way the wisdom of God went to work; As rain into a fleece of wool, as drops of dew distilling on the earth. He who had an unresistable power, would not use so much on this occasion as to break even a bruised reed. 'Tis evident by the choice of unerring wisdom that this is the proper way of Truth, and that 'tis a deceitful wisdom, and takes wrong measures, which goes otherwise. And indeed what can be more wild, then to think to force men into Heaven, and make Saints of them whether they will or no? We see what Christ, what his followers did, we know how we were taught by the great and best succeeding Masters of Christianity. I shall never be perswaded, that those who taught in this manner, were acquainted with these indirect subtleties; at least we should have been acquainted with them much sooner if they had. In fine, I cannot but think, there is very little of a Catholick spirit, in introducing a Doctrine, not only unknown to the ancient Fathers, but so opposite to their Maxims, that it cannot well be imagined how they should contradict it more plainly then they do, unless we fancy them Prophets too, and that they foresaw all the subtleties which should be brought in the world after they left it. Otherwise we cannot expect they should talk of Direct and Indirect, who never thought of either. But they plainly say, There is no Power in the Church but spiritual, and that this spiritual Power does not extend to Temporals: Again, That Princes have none to call them to account but only God, and that just or unjust they must be obey'd, saving only in unjust commands. And if any disguise of words can hinder this from being a plain determination of the Thing, I must needs profess, I know not how it can be determined by them.

But forgetfulness of the Fathers, I fear, is not the worst of the Case. It is pretended in the behalf of the deposing Doctrine, that it relies on

divine

divine Right, and the hot abettors of it will hardly suffer those to pass for good *Catholicks*, who reject it. The truth is, *they cannot well go less*. For while it is acknowledged, as on all hands it is, *That subjection to Princes is commanded by Gods Law*, that which takes away this subjection must be *Gods Law* too, or nothing. And indeed considering the import of the Question, and the immediate influence it has upon a main Point of duty, it cannot well be doubted, *but the Truth*, on which side soever it be, *does belong to Gods Law*. Certainly the Wisdom of God, *who took flesh purposely to instruct the world in all necessary duty*, did not leave out so considerable a part. Now that his *Law* teaches, we are to obey *temporal Princes*, is both plain in it self, and, as I come from saying, plainly confessed by every body. But 'tis evident, *we cannot at the same time obey two Powers commanding contrary things*. Wherefore I cannot see, *but to require obedience in Temporals to the spiritual Power, by the same Law which commands obedience to the Temporal, is to make that Law contradictory, and impossible to be obey'd*. Which as 'tis a Blasphemy intolerable in any *Christian*, so I fear, 'tis unavoidable in those who put a *temporal vertue* in the *spiritual Power*. For that *vertue* plainly obliges to *obedience in Temporals*, to which obedience we are obliged by another vertue, that of the *temporal Power*. And this is to require we should do what *Christ* himself has assured us is impossible to be done, *serve two Masters*.

The way by which they seek to avoid this, is by saying, *Kingly obedience as inferior, must yield to Papal obedience as superior*. Which I think is, *by striving to weather Scylla, to split upon Charibdis*. We have assurance from those, whom we have more reason to credit, *that Kings are inferior only to God, and have none above them but him alone*. I suppose this is to be understood of the same kind of Superiority. For otherwise 'tis ordinary enough for the same man to be both *Superior* and *Inferior* to another, in several respects: as a *Father* to a *Son*, who is a *Magistrate*. But 'tis plain there is no reconciling this Doctrine, with that of a *Papal Superiority in Temporals*. We may as soon obey both when they command contraries; as believe one has no *Superior* besides *God*, to whom the *Pope* is *Superior*.

And yet there is another thing which sticks more with me. This *Papal Superiority in Temporals* is no where to be found, but in their own fancies. There is no such thing in *Scripture* or *Tradition*, *Councils* or *Fathers*. To obtrude upon us an invention of their own heads, and this for a part of *Gods Law*, is to add to the *Law of God*. Let them either shew that place of *Gods Law*, which teaches, *Kingly Power is inferior, and Papal superior*, and this in *Temporals*, or shew how they do not give us for *Gods Law*, that which is not, and entitle themselves to the *maledictions* of the *Apocalyps*. *Feed my sheep*, and, *whatsoever you shall bind is not*, *Kings are inferior in Temporals*, and their interpretation, which hooks in *Temporals*,

is not *Scripture*. Besides the Council of *Trent* has forbid the *Scripture* to be Interpret'd against the unanimous consent of the *Fathers*; And if any one *Father* can be brought, who Interpret's those places as they do, or who does not Interpret them quite contrary, if he meddle with them at all, truly there is more to be said for them than I am aware of.

But let us consider a little farther. In a Question which belongs to *Christian* duty, and the *law of God*, how does, or how should a *Catholic* proceed? I conceive who goes to work like a *Catholic*, should frame his belief according to his *Rule of Belief*. I think that is the use of a *Rule*. To my judgment they go not this way, who are for *Deposing*; as indeed they cannot. For if *Tradition* be, as I conceive it is, the *Catholic Rule*, there is no applying this *Rule* to *Deposition*. Look into all *Bellarmins* Arguments. Those in his *Rom. Pont.* are all from *Reason*, deducing such inferences from *Scripture*, or acknowledg'd points of *Catholic Doctrin*, as make to his purpose. These deductions, till they be acknowledged rightly made, which hitherto is deny'd, and that upon very good grounds, have no force at all to induce belief, and though they were acknowledg'd, would make at most but a *Theological* conclusion. Those against *Barclay* are all from *Authority*, and this *Authority* is either of a single Pope *Boniface* 8, or a great many single men, or those men met together in Councils. For as for *Scripture*, which he pretends, and which indeed would do the business, if it declared it self, he makes nothing of it. Now there is no number, or quality of men, let them be *Catholics* never so much, which obliges to a belief of what they say, otherwise then when they witness, the point in question was received by them from their *Ancestours* as taught originally by *Christ*, which testimony of theirs hands it over, for such a point, to those who come after. In all other cases they speak their own private judgments, and this whether single, or assembled, and for that reason are not parts of *Tradition*, or the *Catholic Rule*, and make no necessity of *Belief*. And these being all the waies they have to the wood, I do not discern the *Catholic way* among them.

But what is the consequence? There are but two things acknowledg'd by *Catholics*, to which we are oblig'd to submit our Judgments, *Scripture* and *Tradition*, if these be truly two and not one thing with two names. For as for Councils, They belong to *Tradition*, and are when duly qualifi'd the most considerable parts of it. In *Scripture* we find *Subjection* and *Obedience*, and this for *Conscience*, poss'ing our *Souls in patience*, expecting our reward in the next world, and the like, no word of *Deposition*. Look into *Tradition*, and we find Ten whole Ages perswaded and practising according to the same *Maxims*, persevering in faithful obedience to just commands, and patient refusal of unjust ones, and apprehending they were oblig'd by the law of God so to do. We find all the *Fathers* of all those Ages confirming them in this apprehension, and inculcating the duty of *Obedience* even to *Tyrants* and *Persecutors*. We find *Popes* themselves not only teaching but practising the same *Doctrine*, obeying commands sometimes thought unreasonable and unjust, and submitting with patience to the pleasures of their then acknowledg'd Lords, the *Emperours*. This is, if any thing can be, *semper & Ubique, & ab omnibus*. And this is the known *Rule* of the *Catholic Church*. The opposite Opinion began at such a time in such a place, and by such a Man; and when it began was cry'd out on as a novelty contrary to the ancient *Doctrin*, which in all other cases is a condemnation without more ado. Neither did they well know at first on what bottom to fix. This *Indirect* came in afterwards. As far as can be guess't they thought, because the Pope was *Superiour* over all *Christians*, he might therefore command all *Christians* any thing. Since, the business coming to be debated, they cast about for waies to maintain it, and the *Indirect way* pleases most, though it be not yet well settled, some thinking it as much too little for the Pope, as others too much.

But

But whatever they think, I fear both the one and the other is ruinous to the Church. For neither can pretend to be believed, but for some reason; and this reason, since it cannot be the same for which we believe other points of Faith, there being manifestly no such thing as *uninterrupted delivery* in the case, must be something else, which as well as *It* must pretend a virtue of inducing belief. And, that being a Rule of Faith, which has power to settle Faith, here is a new Rule of Faith brought into the Church, and with it all the *Incertainty*, and all the *confusion* blamed in the most extravagant *Sects*; and this even by her own confession, who thinks her Rule is the only means to avoid that *incertainty* and that *confusion*. This Rule is manifestly discarded by a new one; For she cannot with any face pretend, *all she teaches was delivered to her*, if it be pin'd upon her, that she teaches what was not delivered; and if she lose the pretence to all, she will keep it to none, since it cannot appear, but if she have once deserted her Rule, she has don't oftner; And then farewell Church. Once take away the Rule, and the Church must of necessity go after. She has no solid ground of Authority but the *steadiness* of her Faith; no *steadiness* of Faith, but the *steadiness* of her Rule; break that once, and there is neither Authority, nor Faith, nor will within a while be Church left.

So that in good earnest, I do not think the malice of all her profest enemies could ever do the Church so much harm, as the zeal of her unwary Friends. At least for my part break but the Chain once, and I know no more any certain way to Heaven, than the veriest *Enthusiast* among all those *Sectaries* who rove blindly for want of a sure Guide, and should find my self as much at a loss. That any thing must be believ'd, but what was taught by Christ, or that any thing can be known to be taught by him, but by the constant belief and practise of intermediate ages, is what a Catholic should neither say, nor endure to hear; for it manifestly takes away Divine from Faith, and all the advantage we profess in our method above others to come to Faith, leaving us as much benighted, and as much to seek, and as small hopes of success, as we object to those whom we think stray most, and are most in the dark. Wherefore, *salvo meliori*, as far as my short prospect reaches, To bring Deposing Faith into the Church, is a ready way to depose the Church.

I cannot tell whether I should more wonder or grieve, but I am sure I do both, to see men so intent upon the main'enance of an Opinion, which they have espoused, that they forget the honour and safety of the Church: and to observe a certain supercilious gravity, with which they labour to discourse these things into Faith and Religion, should so far impose upon the world, that they do not discover they are quite contrary and destructive to both. But no doubt there are enough who see all that is to be seen, but if they be no more forward than I, to say all they think, they are in my conceit the wiser. By the favour of your earnestness, it is no commendable disposition in private men to turn Reformers on every occasion, and when they see any thing amiss, step presently in, and make a bustle in what concerns them not. Let those who Govern the world, and shall severely answer for those miscarriages of which They are the cause, look to their duty. Ours is to live quietly, and unoffensively, and trust God's Providence.

Your importunity has carryed me farther than I intended. But you have now your will of me, and know I for my part think the not-deposing doctrine is the truly Catholic doctrine. Did I think otherwise, all your importunities, and all considerations in the world besides, should not perswade me to it. I hope you now find I said true, when I told you, my thoughts of this matter were such as became a good Christian, and a good Subject, and afford you no occasion to change yours, if you had any good of

Your, &c.

F I N I S.